Land market forces and government’s role in sprawl: T Zhang
zones were added in recent years (Zhao
et al., 1998).
Most districts were located away from the often
crowded and fully developed existing urban centers
to attract foreign investment. However, in many
cases, local government designated new development
districts but either had no financial ability to complete
(or even to start) the project or no foreigners to invest
in it. The result is hundreds of hectares of idle land
surrounding one or two incomplete high-rise office
buildings on the far edges of these cities. (This is
especially true in some small and medium cities, such
as Beihai in Guangxi Province.) A 1995 survey found
that only 2% of the development zones had been com-
pleted by the end of 1992 (Zhao
et al., 1998).
Low density and commercial strip developments
are not characteristics of the Chinese version of
sprawl, in contrast to the American version of urban
sprawl. Also, central city decline resulting from nega-
tive impacts of urban sprawl is not a Chinese phenom-
enon. Central cities are still booming in China,
although statistics show that since 1982 they have
been slowly losing their population (Zhou and Meng,
1998). The main cause of population loss in central
districts is the high price of housing. Not only are
ordinary city residents forced to move out from cen-
tral areas, but average enterprises are often forced to
relocate to municipal fringes due to problems of
affordable land in central areas. New housing projects
in fringes have provided ordinary urban residents bet-
ter living conditions, at the cost of longer commuting
time, and the loss of cultivated land in peripheral
areas. While “richer” people in general prefer to live
in suburban areas in the US, it is the “poorer” who
have to move to fringe areas in Chinese cities. This
is one of the most important differences between the
Chinese and the US versions of sprawl.
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