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Table 9 Land revenue of Shanghai, 1987–1991 (in million RMB)
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| Table 9
Land revenue of Shanghai, 1987–1991 (in million RMB) Revenue 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Cultivated land occupation tax 37 89 57 39 88 Vegetable foundation 103 106 65 25 40 Land use fees 6 11 9 11 17 Urban land use tax – – 236 206 230 Land leasing charge – 104 31 134 149 Total 146 310 398 415 523 Source: Based on Zhao et al., 1998, Table 2-4-2, p. 121. land use power thus helps urban sprawl. In addition, since all municipalities are competing with each other for investment to “speed up economic development”, no single county or village can stop sprawl. Investors can easily make a deal with a neighboring county or village, similar to what happened in the US. Government’s role in sprawl and sprawl control Clearly, under the pressure of the central/superior government’s fund cutting and increasing land demand, the main driving force of urban sprawl in China is local government’s willingness to lease more land in responding to market forces after the reform. Decentralization of land regulation power gives local governments a tool to realize their objective. High land prices stimulate local government’s willingness to “sell” more land. The combination of the market- place and government’s willingness results in the loss of cultivated land and causes urban sprawl. As the loss of cultivated land has become a serious problem not only economically but also politically among senior government leaders, the central govern- ment has initiated a new policy to control over-expan- sion. The motivation of sprawl control in China is to preserve cultivated land and ensure food provision, which is different from the motivation of sprawl con- trol in the US and European countries. In developed countries, the main concerns of sprawl control are basically environmental protection and social justice: to protect open space and reduce deterioration of cen- tral cities (Hu, 1998; Pucher, 1995a, b; Freilich and Peshoff, 1997; Burchell, 1997). China’s sprawl control policy China’s sprawl control policy is a top–down approach; it attempts to contain sprawl from both the supply and the demand side. From the supply side, the central government issued an administration order that no farmland should be allowed to convert to non- agricultural uses from April 1996 to April 1997, allowing the government a “break” to redesign land use policy. Second, starting from 1996, anyone who converts farmland to non-agricultural uses must re- create the same amount of land as farmland. Sources of land to be developed into new farmland include vacant land previously utilized for urban uses and idle land in rural areas. Third, in a land quota system, each 131 municipality is allowed a certain amount of farmland to convert to non-agricultural uses, but no cultivated land can be leased if the municipality has used all its quota. The central government decides land quotas and provincial government manages the quotas. In Spring, 1998, the revised Land Act was formally approved by the National People’s Congress. The Act eliminates the existing “five administration-level” system of land management, and reclaims power on farmland conversion to the central government. The Act also uses economic leverage to reduce cultivated land loss by increasing farmland acquisition reim- bursements to farmers, so land is more expensive now. Starting from January 1, 1999 with the implementation of the 1998 Land Act, any new con- version of farmland is up to the central government’s approval. The re-centralization of land management power reflects the central government’s efforts on sprawl control. Last, each municipality is asked to establish a “permanent cultivated land system” in which farmland will never be allowed for non-agri- cultural uses, a strategy similar to the concept of “per- manent open space” in some developed nations. From the demand side, the central government asked local governments to tighten control over build- ing permits, especially permits for factory construc- tion and certain new commercial developments. The tightening policy is a “one stone–two birds” strategy reflecting the central government’s concern over sprawl, and factory and commercial space over- building, which worsens competition among factories and real estate companies, given the huge amount of idle productive equipments and vacant buildings. The central government also requires review and revision of land use plans of all municipalities, the purpose being to examine land use patterns and save more land in the revised plan. The Department of City Plan- ning of China, a central government body, will super- vise the revision, but the State Land Bureau now grants the final decision on any new farmland acqui- sition, a power given by the new Land Act of 1988. Government’s role in sprawl and sprawl control Although sprawl control represents the public interest and therefore should be supported and implemented by the public sector, the public sector itself is not homogeneous. From a land management perspective Land market forces and government’s role in sprawl: T Zhang in the Chinese context, three sets of government departments act in the public sector—revenue col- lecting, public spending, and land administration. Departments in charge of revenue collection include the Central Internal Revenues and local tax- ation bureaus. Public spending departments have a wide range, from budget bureau at both central and local level, to all public services such as transpor- tation, public health and education. The third interest group within the public sector is land administration and land management institutions which include plan- ning bureaus and land bureaus. Each of the three groups has its own motivations and attitudes toward urban sprawl and sprawl control. In addition, the attitude of bureaus in the central government is different from that of local govern- ment. Because revenue from land leasing and land tax is becoming more important to government budgets, it is not surprising to see that among the three groups of government bureaus, two of them, revenue collec- tion and public spending, both at the central and local level, actually desire more land leasing in general (see Table 10). It is logical that revenue collection departments in both the central and local government would like to draw more income from land development, so they tải về 149.87 Kb. Chia sẻ với bạn bè của bạn:
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