TÁi xáC ĐỊnh giá trị quân lực việt nam cộng hòA
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- Điều hướng trang này:
- NÓI VỀ TÁC GIẢ
- REASSESSING ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN)
- Chunk 1: ARVN in the Earlier Years
- Chunk 2: Tet 1968
- Sidebar: Some Comparisons
- Chunk 3: Territorial Forces
KẾT LUẬN Để kết luận, tôi chỉ xin nói rằng cuộc chiến Việt Nam là một cuộc chiến giá trị, bởi người Nam Việt và các đồng minh của họ bảo vệ một mục đích cao đẹp. Tất cả các chiến binh đều đã tham chiến với một tấm long vô biên và họ đã gần như đạt được mục đích bảo đảm cho NamViệt có tự do như một quốc gia độc lập. Có lần một phóng viên đã nhận xét rằng Đại Tướng Creighton Abrams phải được chỉ huy một cuộc chiến hay hơn. Tôi đã nói câu ấy cho trưởng nam của Tướng Abrahms và được phản hồi ngay; “Cha tôi không nhìn như vậy. Ông nghĩ rằng người Nam Việt rất xứng đáng”. Và tôi đồng ý. Tóm lại, đối chiếu biểu của QLVNCH bao gồm cà địa phương và nghĩa quân trong năm 1970 rất tích cực. Rốt cục chúng ta đã không thắng trận, tuy nhiên tinh thần, sự tận tâm, can đảm và lòng quyết chí của tất cả các chiến binh đã nẩy nở thăng hoa trên đất nước này. Chúng ta đều cùng tiến tới. Lewis Sorley * * * NÓI VỀ TÁC GIẢ 
Ông Lewis Stone "Bob" Sorley III đã phục vụ tại Việt Nam chỉ huy một Tiểu Đoàn Thiết Giáp trên Tây Nguyên. Ông thuộc thế hệ thứ ba trong gia đình tốt nghiệp Đại Học Quân Sự Hoa Kỳ. Ông cũng đậu bằng Tiến Sỹ của Đại Học John Hopkins. Trong hai thập niên binh nghiệp ông chỉ huy thiết giáp và nhiều dơn vị thiết kị tại Mỹ, Đức cũng như Việt Nam. Ông cũng đã phục vụ tại Bộ Lục Quân, văn phòng Tham Mưu Trưởng Bộ Binh và là giảng viên tại West Point và Đại Học Chiến Tranh Bộ Binh. Ông là tác giả của hai cuốn sách, Thunderbolt, General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times và General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command. Ông đã viết quân sử nhan đề, A Better War; the Unexamined Victory and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Year in Vietnam. Ông cũng ghi chép và nhuận chính Vietnam Chronicles: the Abrams Tapes 1968-1972”. Tài liệu tham chiếu: 1. “Bibliography Periodicals” của Douglas Pike. 2. “History Proves Vietnam Victors Wrong” của James Webb. 3. “The Development of the South Vietnamese Army” của Thiếu Tướng James Lawton Collins Jr. 4. “Senior Officer Debriefing Report, CG II Field Force, Vietnam, 29-3-1966 của Đại Tướng Fred C. Weyand. 5. “Message Abrams to Johnson, MAC 5307, 04950Z 6-1967. 6. “Lt-General Dong Van Khuyen, RVNAF Logistics”. 7. “Time, 19 April 1968” 8. “Letter, General Bruce C. Clarke to General Hal C. Pattison” 9. “The History of the Joint Chief of Staff: The Joint Chief of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968” 10. “Brigadier Geberal Zeb B. Bradford Jr. Interview, 12 October 1989” 11. “Message, Abrams to Wheeler and McCain, October 1968” 12. “William Colby, ‘Vietnam after McNamara’, The Wahington Post 27-4-1995”. 13. “Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Thayer Award Address”. 14. “John Paul Vann, Remarks, Lexington, Kentucky, 1972”. 15. “Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, The Cambodian Incursion”. 16. “Geoffrey Perret, There’s a War to be Won”. 17. “Message, Cliff Snyder, National Archives to Sorley”. 18. “An example of LCol Cau Lê 47 Regiment Commander, 12 years in combat and 13 years prisoner of the communist, awarded Silver Star and Bronze Star for valorous combat leadership. Le and his family established a new life in America after his wife Kieu Van had worked as a nurse to support their five children until her husband was released from captivity. See Robert F. Dorr and Fred L. Borch, ‘US Medals’”. 19. “General Cao Van Vien et al, the US Advisor”. 20. ”Lt General Ngo Quang Truong, Territorial Forces”. 21. ”General Creighton Abrams at WIEU, 18 April 1973” 22. “Thomas Polgar as quoted in J. Edward Lee and Toby Haynsworth” 23. “Colonel LeGro as quoted in L. Edward Lê and Toby Haynsworth” 24. “Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Oral History Interview” 25. “Quoted in Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support” 26. “As reported by Major General George J. Forsythe, following a 20 January 1968 meeting with President Thieu” 27. “Joint Chiefs of Staff, the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” 28. “Notes by Vicent Davis on telecom during which Vann described his 15 December 1969 Presentation at Princeton” 29. “Lester A, Sobel, ed,. South Vietnam. US Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia. 30. “Remarks, Lexington, Kentucky 1972, Vann papers” 31. “Ellsworth Bunker Interview, Duke University, Living History Project” 32. “WIEU, 30 January 1973, in Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles” 33. “COMUS Update, 16 February 1971” 34. “Briefing with Admiral McCain, 19 February 1971” 35. “Commanders Weekly Intelligence Update, 20 February 1971” 36. “Message, LtGeneral James W. Sutherland to Abrams, March 1971, Special Abrams Papers Collection” 37. “COMUS with Sir Robert Thompson, 25 March 1971” 38. “Secretary of the Army Brief, 26 April 1971” 39. “Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Lam Son 719” 40. “Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam (University Press of Kansas)” 41. “John Paul Vann, Letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, 9 December 1969, Vann Papers” 42. “Message, Barnes to Weyand, March 1972, MHI files” 43. “Lưu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu (Le Duc Tho and Kissinger Negociation in Paris” 44. “Remarks, Lexington, Kentucky 8 January 1972, Vann Papers” 45. “Douglas Pike, ‘A Look Back at the Vietnam War: the View from Hanoi’” 46. “Douglas Pike, PAVN, People’s Army of Vietnam” 47. “Message, Abrams to Laird, May 1972” 48. “Melvin R. Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lesson of Vietnam” 49. “The Washington Post (28 December 1968)” 50. “James L. Buckley, ‘Vietnam and its Aftermath’ in Anthony T. Bouscaren, ed.” 51. “Merle L. Pribbenow, Message to Sorley, 1 May 2002” 52. “Seth Mydams, ‘A War Story Missing Pages’, The New York Times 24 April 2000” 53. “Vietnam Magazine Auguat 1990” 54. “The Boston Globe, 20 April 2000” 55. “Colonel Stuart Herrington, Fall of Saigon, Discovery Channel, 1 May 1995” 56. “Australian Minister for Immigration Michael McKeller was quoted as saying that ‘about half the boat people perished at sea’. Thus he said in 1979, ‘We are looking at a death rate of between 100,000 and 200,000 in the last four years’. The Age Newspaper, The Boat People: an Age Investigation” * * * REASSESSING ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) Lewis Sorley (A Lecture Delivered at the Vietnam Center Texas Tech University Lubbock, Texas 17 March 2006) No one account could hope to address all the many aspects of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s performance in such a long and complex endeavor as the Vietnam War. This morning, then, I would like to speak to selected aspects, and to do so in the form of eight chunks, two sidebars, and a very brief conclusion. The South Vietnamese government awarded campaign medals to Americans who served in the Vietnam War. Each decoration had affixed to the ribbon a metal scroll inscribed “1960-.“ The closing date was never filled in, for obvious reasons, but for our purposes 1960 will serve as a suitable starting point (one of several that might have been chosen). From that point forward increasing and eventually large-scale American involvement in the Vietnam War provided an excellent vantage point for evaluation and appreciation of the performance rendered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during the period 1960-1975. Some years ago I published an analysis of ARVN’s performance in the 1972 Easter Offensive. I called the piece “Courage and Blood,” and it appeared in Parameters, the journal of the Army War College. The late Douglas Pike commented in a subsequent issue of his periodic Indochina Chronology: “Slowly but steadily the effort goes on to rectify the record and rescue the reputation of the South Vietnamese soldier,” he wrote, “those so casually trashed by the ignorant commercial television reporter and the academic left-winger bent on some ideological mission. Sorley’s writings amount to historical revisionism and he is a sturdy yeoman plowing this particular patch.”1 I have always been grateful for that encouraging assessment, and wish Professor Pike could be with us now to observe how the emerging historical record sustains an increasingly well documented and objective appreciation of the heroic and ultimately successful maturation and performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Only when the United States defaulted on its commitments to South Vietnam, while North Vietnam’s communist allies continued and indeed greatly increased support to their client state, were our unfortunate sometime allies overwhelmed and defeated. Thus far there has never been a full-scale evaluation of ARVN’s evolution and performance over the years of its expansion and development that has been based solely on the record broadly considered. In the limited time available here, I hope to provide the beginnings of a corrective to the incomplete, unfair, and ideologically tainted view of ARVN that until now has largely constituted the conventional wisdom. Americans know very little about the Vietnam War, even though it ended over three decades ago. That is in part because it has been seen by those who opposed the war, or at least opposed their own participation in it, as in their interests to portray every aspect of the long struggle in the worst possible light, and indeed in some cases to falsify what they have had to say about it. James Webb identified the media, academia, and Hollywood as groups that “have a large stake in having the war remembered as both unnecessary and unwinnable.”2 That they also to a large degree dominate the public dialogue helps explain why many have such a distorted view of the war even three decades after the fact. Such distortions extend from wholesale defamation of the South Vietnamese and their conduct throughout a long and difficult struggle to Jane Fonda’s infamous claim that repatriated American prisoners of war who reported systematic abuse and torture by their captors were “liars” and “hypocrites.” It is time to move beyond the unrelentingly negative, often slanderous, and overwhelmingly politicized denunciations of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam - the ARVN Stone "Bob" Sorley III that have characterized so much of the dialogue since the war. Chunk 1: ARVN in the Earlier Years This was a period of American dominance in conduct of the war, with the South Vietnamese basically shoved aside, relegated to pacification duty (which was itself a facet of the war pretty much ignored by the American command) and given little in the way of modernized equipment or combat support. Many people, including some Americans stationed in Vietnam, were critical of South Vietnamese armed forces during this period. But such criticisms seldom took into account a number of factors affecting the performance of those forces. American materiel assistance in these early years consisted largely of providing cast-off World War II American weapons, including the heavy and unwieldy (for a Vietnamese) M-1 rifle. Meanwhile the enemy was being provided the AK-47 assault rifle by his Russian and Chinese patrons. “In 1964 the enemy had introduced the AK47, a modern, highly effective automatic rifle,” noted Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr. in a monograph on development of South Vietnam’s armed forces. “In contrast, the South Vietnam forces were still armed with a variety of World War II weapons….” Then: “After 1965 the increasing U.S. buildup slowly pushed Vietnamese armed forces materiel needs into the background.”3 Thus South Vietnamese units continued to be outgunned by the enemy and at a distinct combat disadvantage. General Fred Weyand, finishing up a tour as commanding general of II Field Force, Vietnam, observed in a 1968 debriefing report that “the long delay in furnishing ARVN modern weapons and equipment, at least on a par with that furnished the enemy by Russia and China, has been a major contributing factor to ARVN ineffectiveness.”4 It was not until General Creighton Abrams came to Vietnam as deputy commander of U.S. forces in May 1967 that the South Vietnamese began to get more attention. Soon after taking up his post Abrams cabled Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson. “It is quite clear to me,” he reported, “that the US Army military here and at home have thought largely in terms of US operations and support of US forces.” As a consequence, “shortages of essential equipment or supplies in an already austere authorization has not been handled with the urgency and vigor that characterizes what we do for US needs. Yet the responsibility we bear to ARVN is clear.” Abrams acknowledged that “the ground work must begin here. I am working at it.”5 Abrams spent most of his year as the deputy trying to upgrade South Vietnamese forces, including providing them the M-16 rifle. By the time of Tet 1968 he had managed to get some of these weapons into the hands of South Vietnamese airborne and other elite units, but the rank and file were still outgunned by the enemy. Thus Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, South Vietnam’s senior logistician, recalled that “during the enemy Tet offensive of 1968 the crisp, rattling sounds of AK-47s echoing in Saigon and some other cities seemed to make a mockery of the weaker, single shots of Garands and carbines fired by stupefied friendly troops.”6 Even so, South Vietnamese armed forces performed admirably in repelling the Tet offensive. “To the surprise of many Americans and the consternation of the Communists,” reported Time magazine, “ARVN bore the brunt of the early fighting with bravery and “lan, performing better than almost anyone would have expected.”7 Nobody mentioned that the ARVN had achieved these results without modern weapons that could match those of the enemy. In February 1968 retired Army General Bruce C. Clarke made a trip to Vietnam. Afterward, Clarke wrote up a trip report which, by way of General Earle Wheeler, made its way to President Lyndon Johnson. Clarke stated in the report that “the Vietnamese units are still on a very austere priority for equipment, to include weapons.” That adversely affected both their moral and effectiveness, he observed. “Troops know and feel it when they are poorly equipped.” After reading the report, LBJ called Clarke to the White House to discuss his findings. Then, recalled Clarke, “within a few days of our visit to the White House a presidential aide called me to say the President had released 100,000 M-16 rifles to ARVN.” 8 President Johnson referred to this matter in his dramatic 31 March 1968 speech. “We shall,” he vowed, “accelerate the re-equipment of South Vietnam’s armed forces in order to meet the enemy’s increased firepower.”9 It was about time. Clarke made another visit to Vietnam in August 1969, when he “found that the ARVN had 713,000 M-16s and other equipment and had made great progress since 1968 Tet.”10 Now ARVN, and the Territorial Forces, were getting not only the most modern rifles, but also M-79 grenade launchers, M-60 machine guns, and AN/PRC-25 radios, equipment the U.S. forces had had all along. U.S. divisions were not only better armed, but larger than South Vietnam’s, resulting in greater combat capability. While he was serving as deputy U.S. commander, recalled his aide-de-camp, General Abrams “had a study done of comparative combat power of U.S. and South Vietnamese divisions. It turned out to be something like sixteen to one due to the superior firepower possessed by the U.S. units. Abrams used that as a point to try to get more resources into the ARVN divisions.”11 To the further disadvantage of the South Vietnamese, during these early years the U.S. hogged most of the combat support that increased unit effectiveness. This included such things as allocation of B-52 bombing strikes, provision of helicopter and fixed-wing gunship support, artillery, and intra-theater troop transport. Abrams noted that during the period of the enemy’s “Third Offensive” in August and September 1968 “the ARVN killed more enemy than all other allied forces combined.” In the process, he noted, they also “suffered more KIA, both actual and on the basis of the ratio of enemy to friendly killed in action.” This was a function, he told General Wheeler, of the fact that the South Vietnamese “get relatively less support, both quantitatively and qualitatively, than US forces, i.e., artillery, tactical air support, gunships and helilift.”12 Under these conditions of the earlier years, criticism of South Vietnamese units was a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given little to work with, outgunned by the enemy, and relegated to what were then viewed as secondary roles, South Vietnam’s armed forces missed out for several years on the development and combat experience that would have greatly increased their capabilities. Later Robert McNamara, who as Defense Secretary had presided over the American war effort in those same years, wrote disparagingly of the Vietnamese, earning a searing rebuke from William Colby. “He should not be contemptuously slandering Vietnamese who gave their lives and efforts to prevent Communist rule,” wrote Colby, “but who saw their great-power protector wash its hands of them because of the costs of McNamara’s failed policies. The cause,” affirmed Colby, “was indeed ‘noble.’ America fought it the wrong way under McNamara, and lost it in good part because of him.” 13 Chunk 2: Tet 1968 The widespread fighting at Tet of 1968 was ARVN’s first great test. To the surprise of many, it turned in a valorous performance. Later, at West Point to receive the Thayer Award, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker took the opportunity to praise this accomplishment. “The Vietnamese armed forces,” he noted, “though below strength, fought well—as General Abrams said, they fought probably better than they thought they could. There were no uprisings or defections, the government did not fall apart. On the contrary,” recalled Bunker, “it reacted strongly, quickly and decisively. It set about the task of recovery with great energy.”14 The outstanding performance of South Vietnamese forces during the Tet Offensive in 1968 was absolutely crucial to their country’s future. “The result,” observed Ambassador Bunker, “was to set in motion a whole series of developments which contributed significantly to the strengthening of the government, to increasing the confidence of the people in its ability to cope with the enemy, and to a determination by the government to take over more of the burden of the war.”15 John Paul Vann agreed, saying in 1972 that Tet had “precipitated those actions which have now paid off so handsomely in government expansion of control in South Vietnam.” Vann cited full manpower mobilization, permitting expansion of the armed forces as U.S. troops were withdrawn, and emphasized in particular increases in the Territorial Forces which provided for an enduring government presence in the countryside.16 At the time of the enemy’s “Third Offensive” in the autumn of 1968, having by then taken command of U.S. forces in Vietnam, Abrams cabled General Earle Wheeler and Admiral John McCain. “I am led to the conclusion that the cited results,” referring to a recent six-week period during which the ARVN had killed more enemy than all other allied forces combined, “indicate progress in ARVN leadership and aggressiveness.” Abrams also commented on the price the ARVN was paying for these successes. “The lower ratio of enemy to friendly KIA, which I attribute in part to thinner combat support,” he said, “is a further argument for expediting the upgrading of ARVN equipment.”17 When senior American and South Vietnamese officials met on Midway Island in June 1969, a prominent topic was expansion and upgrading of South Vietnam’s armed forces. An initial increase in structure to 820,000—later to expand to 1.1 million as a result of this and subsequent agreements—was approved, “along with projects to equip the RVNAF with new weapons such as the M-16 rifle, M-60 machine gun and LAW rocket,” recalled ARVN Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho. 18 That such weapons as the M-16 were still being negotiated at this late stage shows how long the South Vietnamese had been left to fight underarmed in comparison to the enemy. Sidebar: Some Comparisons Here are some of the things the ARVN did not do: + Have as many as fifty men a day desert while under the direct supervision of their commander-in-chief. That was General George Washington’s army at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-1778.19 + Have to put artillery into the streets to quell civilian anti-draft riots. That was what President Abraham Lincoln was forced to do in New York City in April 1865 during the American Civil War. + Show up for the climactic battle of the war at about half strength because of desertions. That was American General George Meade’s Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg. “He expected to find 160,000 soldiers, but instead found only 85,000 because 75,000 had deserted. During the [American] Civil War, the average Union desertion rate was 33 percent, and for the Confederates, 40 percent.”20 + Conduct a general strike in which soldiers in half the divisions of the army refused to attack. That was the French Army in 1917, after which 554 soldiers were condemned to death by courts-martial and 49 were actually shot.21 + Be unique in having some units fail in the face of the enemy. On Bougainville during World War II Company K of the U.S. 25th Infantry “broke and ran.” Commented historian Geoffrey Perret: “There was hardly a division in the Army that didn’t have at least one company that had done the same.”22 + Have a unit in which its assistant division commander was relieved, four senior staff were fired, two of the original battalion commanders were captured, and the remaining nine were replaced. That was the U.S. 36th Infantry Division at Salerno in World War II.23 + Conduct an unrelenting campaign of shelling, assassinations, kidnapping, and impressment against innocent civilians. That was the work of the communist enemy throughout the Vietnam War. + Commit massacres of friendly civilian elements such as those at Thuy Bo and My Lai. Those were the deeds of American troops in Vietnam during 1967 and 1968. Additional examples could be amassed almost without limit. The point is that, in comparison to other forces both then and historically, the ARVN during its war conducted itself respectably and loyally, attributes for which it has never gotten the credit it deserves. Documentation of individual ARVN heroism and professional performance is abundant, although thus far little used by historians and all but ignored by journalists. In the National Archives are the records of thousands and thousands of U.S. awards to South Vietnamese for valor and service.24 Such heroism and devotion to duty are revealed as all the more admirable when it is considered that many South Vietnamese soldiers spent a decade or more at war, in many cases essentially their entire adult (and adolescent) lives. As one insightful American once observed, the South Vietnamese had no DEROS (the “date eligible for return from overseas” of Americans on a one-year tour of duty in Vietnam). Instead, they soldiered on, year after year after year, with incredible devotion and stoicism. Many, after the communist “liberation” of the south, spent another decade or more struggling to survive the ordeal of incarceration by the communists in the murderous so-called reeducation camps.25 Chunk 3: Territorial Forces Following the enemy’s offensive at the time of Tet 1968, the American command changed. General Creighton Abrams replaced General Westmoreland and brought to bear a much different outlook on the nature of the war and how it should be prosecuted. Abrams stressed “one war” of combat operations, pacification, and upgrading South Vietnam’s armed forces, giving those latter two long-neglected tasks equal importance and priority with military operations. Those military operations also underwent dramatic change. In place of “search and destroy” there was now “clear and hold,” meaning that when the enemy had been driven from populated areas those areas were then permanently garrisoned by allied forces, not abandoned to be reoccupied by the enemy at some later date. In perhaps the most important development of the entire war, greatly expanded South Vietnamese Territorial Forces took on that security mission. Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh called “expansion and upgrading of the Regional and Popular Forces” “by far the most important and outstanding among US contributions” to the war effort.26 Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong noted that such achievements as hamlets pacified, the number of people living under GVN [Government of Vietnam] control, or the trafficability on key lines of communication were possible largely due to the unsung feats of the RF and PF.”27 When General Abrams arrived in Vietnam in May of 1967, the South Vietnamese armed forces consisted of army, navy, marine and air force elements. Separate and apart were what were called the Territorial Forces, consisting of Regional Forces and Popular Forces. These latter were dedicated to local security, with the Regional Forces under control of province chiefs and the Popular Forces answering to district chiefs. These Regional Forces and Popular Forces, which remained in place in their home areas, were what put the “hold” in “clear and hold” operations. By 1970 they had grown to some 550,000 men and, integrated at that time into the regular armed forces, constituted more than half the total strength. By coincidence, last evening Bing West and another guest were on the PBS “News Hour with Jim Lehrer” to talk about the current situation in Iraq. One of them cited “Condeleeza Rice’s concept of ‘clear and hold’“. If anyone cared to trace the etymology of that concept they would find a straight shot from the Territorial Forces in South Vietnam to General Creighton Abrams to General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study to Colonel Jasper Wilson. As early as October 1968 William Colby, newly installed as deputy to General Abrams for pacification support, explained the importance of these elements: “For territorial security, our main focus is on improvement of the Regional and Popular Forces, which are almost half of the army now.” “We started last October. General Abrams had a conference here, identified some thirty steps to take,” including “sending out small military advisor teams to work with the RF companies and PF platoons. We now have some 250 of those five-man teams scattered around the country.” Three months later Colby noted the rapid buildup of and the improved training and armament being provided the RF and PF: “There’re about 91,000 more of them today than there were a year ago.” About 100,000 now had M16s, which they didn’t have a year ago. And 350 advisory teams were living and working with RF and PF units. Abrams had, soon after taking command, deliberately channeled the new rifles to these elements. “The RF and PF, a year ago,” he said in August 1969, “received the highest priority of anybody. That’s where the first M16s went, before ARVN.” “They’ve been given, for over a year, the very highest priority. And, to be perfectly frank, it’s like anything else. I mean, you put your money in soldiers’ deposits, you get 10 percent [interest] and so on. Goddamn it, we made an investment here, and there ought to be. That’s priority, above anybody else in the country, over a year ago!” As the RF and PF improved in capabilities - and performance - Abrams wanted to see them get credit for what they were accomplishing. “One thing I’ve been chafing under,” he said at the WIEU, “- when we brief visitors, the role of the RF and PF in this war is substantially submerged. There’s a tendency to talk about the ARVN, and for some time now the RF and PF have borne the brunt of casualties and this sort of thing, and the toll that they’re exacting from the enemy is substantial - I mean, if you just want to deal in that sort of thing. But if we get talking about the security of the people this is a big part of this whole thing. This is where it is.” About that same time he took a stance prompted by the good performance of these elements: “I don’t know if I would really favor any more rifle companies in the ARVN. If the manpower was available, I think the investment in Territorial Forces would be of greater value.” At the end of 1969 Abrams, contemplating a chart displaying “the trend in what’s happened the last three or four months in who’s making a contribution - weapons, KIA,” had this to say: “It’s kind of interesting. In terms of results, which is enemy killed, weapons captured, caches, and so on, the ARVN contribution stayed at about the same - 26 percent, 27 percent. And U.S. and Free World percent has gone down. And, at least percentage-wise, that slack has been taken up by the Territorial Forces. And this has happened since August.” Someone: “It’s the nature of the war.” Abrams: “Yes, that’s right. But it’s also - you know, I was always wondering about what the hell would we get for that investment in those 300,000 M16s - you know, all that? Well, it’s commencing to show.” They were hanging on to those weapons, too. As Bill Colby pointed out in July 1970, for the Territorial Forces the weapons gained/lost ratio was then about three enemy weapons taken for every friendly weapon lost; five years ago just the opposite had been the case. Abrams’s comment: “Territorial Forces?” “Ah, these rabbits are coming along good!” And finally, at a Commanders WIEU in October 1971: “One of the things that, and it’s been for a long time, the RF and PF are carrying the major burden of the war.” Senior Vietnamese officers agreed. “Gradually, in their outlook, deportment, and combat performance,” said Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, “the RF and PF troopers shed their paramilitary origins and increasingly became full-fledged soldiers.” So decidedly was this the case, Truong concluded, that “throughout the major period of the Vietnam conflict” the RF and PF were “aptly regarded as the mainstay of the war machinery.” 28 Expanded in numbers and better armed and better trained, the Territorial Forces came into their own, earning the respect of even so tough a critic as Lieutenant General Julian Ewell. “They were the cutting edge of the war,” he said admiringly. Каталог: groups -> 20745874 -> 1517459420 -> name groups -> Viettudan an ban/ Edition: unicode fonts Dau tranh cho Tu-do Ca-nhan & Nguyen-tac Dan-chu Xa-hoi tai Viet-Nam groups -> Lời Tuyên Bố của các Công Dân Tự Do groups -> PHẦn chuyển tiếp kính thưa quý vị và các bạn trẻ, giữa những ngưới Việt chúng ta, tôi nói groups -> Ý Nga sưu tầm và cập nhật hóa ngày 21-4-2013, với nhạc của nhạc sĩ: TừYên, Hà Thúc Sinh vừa thêm vào groups -> BÁo cáo môn: RÈn luyện nghiệp vụ SƯ phạM 3 groups -> Phản Bội hay Tự Do cho Việt Nam ? groups -> Tin khoa hoc december 31, 2010 Những vụ phóng vệ tinh thất bại trong 2010 Trong năm 2010, một số quốc gia đã vấp phải các sự cố trong việc phóng vệ tinh vào không gian groups -> Một Thời Bạn Học Revised 8/4/10 việt nam name -> XáC ĐỊnh giá trị quân lực vnch tải về 320.18 Kb. Chia sẻ với bạn bè của bạn:
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