Rebalance to asia with an insecure china
China’s Vision: a ‘‘New Type of Relationship’’
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- Điều hướng trang này:
- Accounting for an Insecure China
- Reassessing Engagement
- Diversifying and Deepening Rebalancing
- Author’s Biographical Sketch
China’s Vision: a ‘‘New Type of Relationship’’ With several acts in the drama of America’s rebalancing to Asia to follow, there is an increasing dissonance between the future direction of U.S. regional policy and China’s view of what would constitute a stable U.S.—China relationship. In what could only be interpreted as a highly coordinated effort endorsed by the senior-most leadership in Beijing, Chinese government officials have in multiple venues and at the highest levels promoted the notion that the United States and China should work toward a ‘‘new type of relationship between major powers.’’ The concept was floated during then-Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington in February 2012 and subsequently reinforced and elaborated upon by the major players in the bilateral relationship, including President Hu Jintao, State Counselor Dai Bingguo, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, and Vice Foreign Minister for North America and Oceania Cui Tiankai. 30 The intellectual roots of this idea are relatively clear. For at least a decade, Chinese scholars, think tanks, and study groups have closely examined the historical rise and fall of great powers.31 And while warning against the cultural invasion of the United States, Chinese strategists have freely imported Western theories of international relations - namely offensive realism and power transition theory - that portend inevitable great power conflict between established and rising powers.32 In turn, a principal task for Chinese thinkers has been uncovering means to subdue this (assumed) historical impulse, particularly while China’s ascension and military modernization remain incomplete. Yuan Peng, Assistant President at the influential China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), has argued that ‘‘building a new type of relations between major powers is the only way to prevent the two countries from entering violent conflict as previous major powers did.’’ 33 This concept was given an unanticipated boost by a March 2012 speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace in which Secretary Clinton argued that the United States and China needed ‘‘a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.’’ 34 Disregarding the substance of the speech, which cautioned China against being an injurious ‘‘selective stakeholder’’ in international politics, the Chinese diplomatic community fixated on this one line as evidence that the concept was taking hold in Washington. Chinese officials also cite a meeting on the sidelines of the June 2012 G-20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, in which President Hu and President Obama reportedly discussed the need for a new type of bilateral relationship. 35 In July, then - Vice President Xi told an audience at Tsinghua University, his alma mater, that ‘‘China and the U.S. are actively exploring a new type of relations between major countries.’’ 36 Chinese discourse surrounding the idea of a ‘‘new type of relationship’’ contains a number of positive elements, which describe shared goals in the bilateral relationship that have been repeatedly and publicly articulated by both sides. The United States endorses the notion of avoiding zero-sum competition and working assiduously to avert a spiraling security dilemma. Furthermore, expanding areas of cooperation and increasing bilateral communication are principal goals of U.S. - China policy. In its entirety, however, the concept is a poison pill for the United States because of China’s view of how best to meet these shared goals, which in Vice Foreign Minister Cui’s words requires ‘‘removing obstacles’’ and ‘‘accommodating each other’s interests.’’ 37 Chinese officials do not see this as a reciprocal process, but rather one in which the United States - perceived as the primary source of mistrust and conflict - must unilaterally meet China’s demands. Cui (promoted to be China’s ambassador to the United States in April 2013) has argued that ‘‘China has never done anything to undermine U.S. core interests and major concerns, yet what the United States has done in matters concerning China’s core and important interests and major concerns is unsatisfactory.’’ 38 Referencing instability in the South China Sea as an example, Cui has suggested that ‘‘China is not the maker of these problems, and still less the perpetrator of harm. Rather, it is a victim on which harm has been imposed.’’ 39 Against this backdrop, China has called upon the United States to walk the talk and move beyond rhetorical statements about seeking a cooperative partnership with China. 40 This means curbing actions that Beijing views as both running counter to China’s interests and eroding mutual strategic trust between the two powers. The new type of relationship China is calling for is one in which the United States stops selling arms to Taiwan, abandons efforts to expand the U.S. military’s forward- deployed presence in Asia, lifts controls on exports to China, withdraws from security arrangements with allies and partners in the region (particularly from those with ongoing maritime and territorial disputes with China), removes theater missile defense capabilities, and ceases sea and air reconnaissance operations around China. Even if one considers this list more aspirational than expected, the United States has no other readily available alternative set of bargaining chips that could serve the same function of assuaging China’s insecurities. Most of these are enduring elements of U.S. national security strategy that are unlikely to change solely to accommodate China’s anxieties. Furthermore, there is little evidence that China would do anything more than pocket U.S. concessions and continue to press for further advantage. The particular language of a ‘‘new type of relationship’’ is largely irrelevant. What matters most for the future of U.S. - China relations is that the United States is unlikely to take even a minority of the actions Beijing would deem necessary to solidify strategic trust and provide China with a satisfying dose of regional security. Accounting for an Insecure China China’s foreign policies have for decades reflected the principles of biding time, pursuing a restrained foreign policy, and viewing the first decades of the twenty- first century as a period of strategic opportunity to focus primarily on internal development.41 This strategy, however, has relied on the belief in Beijing that China’s commitment to the path of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ was leading the country toward greater prosperity and security, a supposition coming under increasing scrutiny in Beijing. 42 U.S. analysts are correct to assert that, to date, China’s leaders have continued to recognize the importance of pursuing a constructive U.S. - China relationship. 43 That said, particularly with China emerging from the inward-looking period of its decennial leadership transition, an array of potential scenarios – Chinese economic slowdown, domestic political cleavages over the pace and direction of economic reform, a spike in nationalism due to perceived external challenges - could raise the political cost for Chinese leaders who seek to perpetuate U.S. - China relations in their current state. The danger in the years ahead is that deepened U.S. engagement in Asia and its associated perceptions in China could amplify already existent voices in Beijing who argue that the current trajectory of regional affairs is placing China under siege in a deteriorating security environment. 44 Precisely how Beijing would respond is unknown, but it is hard to imagine that the United States would benefit from a China less committed to its relations with the United States. More rapid military modernization, the development of trade or diplomatic blocs that exclude the United States, assertive behavior in its near seas, the cultivation of explicit security ties with regional partners, more aggressive use of cyber intrusions into the United States, and increasingly discriminatory trade practices are among the policies Beijing could pursue. Even if China viewed its options in these domains as relatively limited and ultimately undesirable, it could still throw sand in the gears of U.S. efforts in the region. Although China’s behavior has been problematic on regional issues ranging from the South and East China Seas to North Korea, Burma, and ASEAN, there is no doubt that Beijing could create far more mischief if it perceived a truly zero-sum rivalry with the United States that compelled a hard-nosed competition for influence in Asia. Preventing this outcome - and the major power war that could accompany it - are chief among the tasks of U.S. China policy. There are real and significant areas of competition between the United States and China, and structuring the relationship to manage them is a more sensible approach than believing they can be solved or willed away through reassurance or by augmenting mutual trust. With the rebalancing effort galloping forward, and the United States unwilling (under current conditions) to entertain the acts of retrenchment which Beijing is calling for, Washington will need to devise its Asia policies to account for a suspicious and agitated Beijing. This means implicitly, if not explicitly, engineering engagement to focus more on laying the institutional groundwork for crisis management. The Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) has provided an important forum to do just that, bringing together Chinese civilian and military leaders with their U.S. counterparts to discuss sensitive bilateral and regional security issues. At the same time, U.S. policymakers will ultimately have to come to terms with the fact that dialogue and reassurance will only go so far. The domestic and international sources of China’s interests and insecurities run far deeper than short-term policy decisions in Washington. Accepting this reality, the U.S. should eschew the notion that U.S. - China relations represent ‘‘the most important bilateral relationship in the world,’’ and should resist the oft-made remark that ‘‘virtually no global challenge can be met without China - U.S. cooperation.’’45 Neither statement is particularly accurate, and both serve to create unrealistic expectations, produce unnecessary disappointment and animus, and ultimately contribute to greater bilateral friction. Reassessing Engagement As Washington contends with a prickly Beijing in the years ahead, it will be tempting for U.S. policymakers to question the value of committing substantial resources to sustaining high-intensity engagement with China. 46 This would be a serious mistake. The new set of officials taking the reins of Asia policy in the second Obama administration will have the weighty task of maintaining a high tempo of U.S. - China diplomacy and building the personal relationships that have been crucial for stability. Bilateral engagement with China is unlikely to produce breakthroughs on North Korea, Iran, or the South China Sea, but it will nonetheless be necessary to weather the storms that are likely to occur between Washington and Beijing, as well as China and its neighbors. A critical lesson drawn from U.S. - China relations in 2012 is that the considerable commitment by the Obama administration to engage Chinese counterparts paid enormous dividends during certain crises, such as incidents in the South China Sea and the Chen Guangcheng case (when the dissident Chen escaped house arrest in April 2012 and sought refuge at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing). Both governments agree that the maturity of the relationship after years of investment was key to keeping these crises from escalating further. From a broader regional perspective, continued intensive political engagement with China pays additional dividends for the United States. This is true even for those who are deeply skeptical about Beijing’s intentions and would prefer that the United States prepare more proactively for an aggressive and revisionist China. In the current strategic environment, a hard-line policy toward Beijing - one that emphasizes economic and security competition at the expense of intensive diplomatic engagement - would undermine the rebalancing to Asia and hinder America’s ability to shape the region in ways that can deter, defeat, and punish Chinese aggression. Assessing the specific components of the rebalancing effort - including those that contribute to the hedging side of the U.S. China policy - it is evident that most initiatives would be undercut by deepened divisions between Washington and Beijing. Short of overt and unprecedented provocations from China, soured U.S. - China relations would lead U.S. alliance partners - including South Korea, Thailand, and even Australia - to become more cautious in expanding their security activities with Washington.47 Emerging partners like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore would also move to scale back military relations with the United States. Meanwhile, efforts to strengthen regional rules and institutions to manage and resolve potential conflicts would grind to a halt if multilateral organizations were seen as little more than venues for U.S. – China competition. Finally, even the U.S. trade agenda and progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership would likely stall if China became committed to using its economic muscle to counter U.S. interests. Ultimately, even if engagement is not producing tangible results in the bilateral relationship, sustaining a well-functioning - if not always positive - diplomatic relationship with Beijing is critical to achieving U.S. objectives elsewhere in the region. Countries in Asia have little choice but to manage the economic, diplomatic, and geographic realities of a rising China, and in doing so, few are willing to sign up for an overt counter-balancing coalition against Beijing. This is precisely why leaders throughout Asia have made clear to Washington that they have little interest in choosing sides between the two giants or being dragged into an adversarial dynamic. U.S. strategists who call for the United States to abandon its long-standing neutrality on regional territorial disputes miss the strategic imperative of being seen as an honest broker in the region.48 From this vantage point, the two prongs of U.S. China strategy - engagement and balancing - are mutually reinforcing, rather than opposing. Diversifying and Deepening Rebalancing With an eye toward sustaining regional support for the U.S. rebalancing to Asia, Washington will have to better explain the content and origin of the strategy. This means working to diminish perceptions of competition between the United States and China by continuing to search for ways in which the two countries can work together in Asia. Announcements by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Yang of the launch of an array of U.S. - China joint cooperative projects in the Asia - Pacific at the past two ASEAN Regional Forums, while small in scale, provide a useful platform from which to build. Actively solving problems together sends an important signal both domestically and regionally that the United States is interested in practical cooperation with China, and vice versa. Washington should also continue to reiterate - perhaps with greater emphasis - that it prefers others in the region to also have strong and positive ties with Beijing. (This also means communicating to allies and partners that the U.S. rebalancing to Asia does not give regional states the license to challenge or provoke China.) The United States should also continue to search for additional opportunities to include the PLA in regional military exercises. Secretary Panetta’s announcement that China would be invited to the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercise was a step in the right direction. Multilateral military engagement with China should also be explored with U.S. Marines now rotating through Darwin, Australia, possibly with other key regional actors such as Indonesia. In the meantime, the United States should seek to demonstrate to the region the inherent value of the U.S. military presence beyond high-end deterrence and dynamics with China. For instance, the United States could address non-traditional security challenges like humanitarian crises, natural disasters, human trafficking, and narcotics. Over the long term, it is crucial that governments and publics in Asia perceive U.S. efforts as sustained and earnest, and not as Trojan horses for developing improved access for warfighting. At the same time, the United States should, to the extent possible, seek to address the chronic misperception that the rebalancing effort is primarily a military and security endeavor. Official commentary in China, as is true elsewhere, has focused on U.S. force posture revisions more than any other aspect of President Obama’s Asia policy.49 In response, leading U.S. officials have made major policy speeches both in Washington and the region aimed at underscoring the breadth of the U.S. agenda in Asia, including Leon Panetta at the PLA Engineering Academy of Armored Forces in Beijing and Tom Donilon at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In previewing Obama’s second term, Donilon noted explicitly that the rebalancing to Asia is a ‘‘multi-dimensional strategy’’ that ‘‘harnesses every element of our national power.’’50 U.S. officials will have to continue sending these messages both rhetorically and through action. As the U.S. shift to Asia continues to evolve, additional resources must go toward diplomatic, social, and economic initiatives. The Obama administration has taken initial steps with the Asia - Pacific Strategic Engagement Initiative (APSEI) and the new U.S. mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, Indonesia. Particularly as future security agreements come online, it will be increasingly necessary for the U.S. government to credibly make the case that defense policy is only one piece of a much broader agenda that includes investment, trade, development, tourism, and other forms of cultural exchange. Cooperative activities in energy and health announced by the White House at the conclusion of the 2012 East Asia Summit demonstrate the types of non-security efforts where the United States can contribute much-needed assets and expertise to the region.51 It will likely prove impossible to perfectly reconcile the rebalancing effort with building positive and cooperative U.S. - China relations, but it is imperative that the United States does what it can to lower the dissonance between these critical objectives. U.S. China policy will have to remain focused on managing the consequences of an insecure Beijing and preventing relations from spiraling downward. At the same time, rebalancing, even as it continues apace, should emphasize non-security dimensions, as well as the ways in which U.S. activities are strengthening relations with China and serving the interests of the region. No matter what, U.S. policymakers will need to go to great lengths to sustain the level of political engagement with Beijing necessary both to maintain stable U.S. - China relations and to permit the rebalancing effort to go forward. Ely Stefansky Ratner, Dr. Notes 1. For an official articulation of the ‘‘pivot’’ or ‘‘rebalancing’’ strategy, see Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century,’’ Foreign Policy, Nov 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. 2. For a discussion on the multiple dimensions of Chinese distrust of the United States, see Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, ‘‘How China Sees America,’’ Foreign Affairs, September/October 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrew-/j-/ nathan-/and-/andrew-/scobell/how-/china-/sees-/america. 3. Zhong Sheng, ‘‘Inconsistency between Words and Deeds Lowers U.S. Influence in Asia-/ Pacific,’’ People’s Daily Online, June 5, 2012, as cited in Michael Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,’’ China Leadership Monitor no.38, August 6, 2012, p. 23. http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-/leadership-/monitor/ article/124546. Note that Zhong Sheng is widely considered a pseudonym for the editorial staff of the People’s Daily International Department, not an individual contributor. 4. Pew Research Center, ‘‘Ratings for the U.S. Decline: Growing Concerns in China about Inequality, Corruption,’’ Pew Global Attitudes Project, October 16, 2012, http:// www.pewglobal.org/2012/10/16/growing-/concerns-/in-/china-/about-/inequality-/corruption.
Thornton Center Monograph Series, no. 4 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, March 2012), p. 8 and 10-/1. http://www.brookings.edu/research/ papers/2012/03/30-/us-/china-/lieberthal. The authors co-/wrote the opening and closing chapters of the report, but each independently penned a section on ‘‘Understanding Strategic Distrust’’ from the perspective of their respective countries. 6. For a typical presentation of this argument see Zhong Sheng, ‘‘Hold mainstream of hina-ASEAN relations,’’ People’s Daily, April 6, 2012. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7779588.html. 7. See quotes from Read Admiral Yang Yi of the PLA’s National Defense University in ichael Chase and Benjamin Purser, ‘‘Pivot and Parry: China’s Response to America’s New Defense Strategy,’’ China Brief 12, no. 6, March 15, 2012, http://www.jamestown. org/single/?no_cache/1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D/39143.
Xinhua, September 4, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-/09/04/c_ 131825846.htm.
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-/05/07/content_15226749.htm. 10. For a primer on the dynamics in the South China Sea, see Patrick Cronin, Peter Dutton, Taylor Fravel, James Holmes, Robert Kaplan, Will Rogers, and Ian Storey, ‘‘Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea,’’ (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2012), http://www. cnas.org/southchinasea.
New York Times, July 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo. html.
York Times, October 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/world/asia/in-/speech-/ organized-/by-/beijing-/ex-/diplomat-/calls-/islands-/dispute-/with-/japan-/a-/time-/bomb.html.
Eaton, and Kevin Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States, (RAND Corporation, 2007), http://www.rand. org/pubs/monographs/MG524.html. 22. See U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),’’ January 17, 2012. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf. For more on Air-/Sea Battle, see Greg Jaffe, ‘‘U.S. model for a future war fans tensions with China and inside Pentagon,’’ The Washington Post, August 1, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-/security/us-/model-/for-/a-/future-/war-/fans-/tensions-/with-/china-/and-/inside/pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX_story.html. 23. For example, see John Banusiewicz, ‘‘Gates Describes U.S. Approach to Deterrence in Asia,’’ American Forces Press Service, June 5, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id/59503. 24. ‘‘U.S. military expansion in Southeast Asia,’’ The Washington Post, March 26, 2012. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-/security/2012/03/25/gIQASFQXaS_graphic.html. 25. Congressional Research Service, U.S.—/Vietnam Relations in 2011: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Mark Manyin, Washington, DC, March 18, 2012, p. 20. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40208.pdf. 26. Carlyle Thayer, ‘‘Vietnam’s Defensive Diplomacy,’’ The Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703649004575438474083884494.html. 27. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, ‘‘Media Availability with Secretary Panetta in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.’’ Presentation in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, on June 3, 2012. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid/5051. 28. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), ‘‘Joint Press Briefing with Secretary Panetta and Vietnamese Minister of Defense Gen. Phung Quang Thanh from Hanoi, Vietnam.’’ Transcript of press briefing, June 4, 2012. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid/5052. 29. Donna Miles, ‘‘Exercise Cobra Gold 2013 Kicks Off in Thailand,’’ American Forces Press Service, Headquarters Marine Corps, February 11, 2013. http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/3488/Article/137917/exercise-/cobra-/gold-/2013-/kicks-/off-/in-/thailand.aspx. 30. See Speech by Hu Jintao, ‘‘Promote Win-/Win Cooperation and Build a New Type of Relations Between Major Countries,’’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 4, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t931392.htm; Speech by Xi Jinping at the Opening Ceremony of the World Peace Forum, ‘‘Work Together to Maintain World Peace and Security’’ Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, July 7, 2012, http://au.china-/embassy.org/eng/xw/t951973.htm; ‘‘Yang JiechiMeets with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,’’ Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in South Africa, September 28, 2012, http://www.chinese-/embassy.org.za/eng/zt/topic1/t976737.htm; Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, ‘‘On the Asia-/Pacific and Sound China-/U.S. Interaction in the Region,’’ Asia Society Hong Kong Center, July 5, 2012, http://asiasociety.org/hong-/kong/complete-/transcript-/cui-/tiankai-/asia-/society-/hong-/kong; Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, ‘‘China-US Relations in China’s Overall Diplomacy in the New Era: On China and U.S. Working Together to Build a New Type of Relationship Between Major Countries,’’ China International Strategy Review, July 2012. For a discussion of the evolution of the concept see Michael Chase, ‘‘China’s Search for a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’,’’ China Brief 12, no. 17, Sep. 7, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache/1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D/39820&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D/13&cHash/594d52e37385027b85b63e69526e385d.
Quarterly 35, no 1 (Winter 2001): pp. 36-/7, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11winter ratner.pdf. 32. For example see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton, 2001); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981); and George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, (Seattle: Uni. of Washington Press, 1987). 33. Yuan Peng, ‘‘Building new type of relations the only choice for China, US,’’ People’s Daily, May 8, 2012. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102774/7811505.html. CICIR is affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security. 34. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Department of State, ‘‘Remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace China Conference.’’ Speech at USIP in Washington, D.C., March 7, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/185402.htm. 35. For example, see Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, ‘‘On the Asia-/Pacific and Sound China-/U.S. Interaction in the Region,’’ transcript of speech at the Asia Society Hong Kong Center, July 5, 2012, http://asiasociety.org/hong-/kong/complete-/transcript-/cui-/tiankai-/asia-/society-/hong-/kong. 36. Xi Jinping, ‘‘Work Together to Maintain World Peace and Security,’’ speech at the Opening Ceremony of the World Peace Forum, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Australia, July 7, 2012, http://au.china-/embassy.org/eng/xw/t951973.htm. 37. Cui Tiankai, ‘‘On the Asia-/Pacific and Sound China-/U.S. Interaction in the Region’’; Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, ‘‘China-/US Relations in China’s Overall Diplomacy in the New Era.’’ 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Wang Fan, ‘‘U.S. should back up its proclaimed "good intentions" in Asia-/Pacific with action,’’ Xinhua, March 6, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-/06/03/c_131628241.htm. 41. For a comprehensive assessment of Chinese foreign policy, see Evan Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG850.html. 42. See Zheng Bijian, ‘‘China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-/Power Status,’’ Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2005, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-/bijian/chinas-/peaceful-/rise-/to-/great-/power-/status. 43. For example see Michael Chase and Benjamin Purser, ‘‘Pivot and Parry,’’ op. cit. 44. For an analysis of more militarist voices in China, see Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘Some Chinese Military Officers, Hawkish And Outspoken On Graft, A Challenge For Leadership,’’ Associated Press, October 28, 2012, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_CHINA_THE_MILITARY_FACTOR?SITE/MABED&SECTION/HOME&TEMPLATE/DEFAULT. 45. Similar quotes appear frequently in commentaries and articles. For examples see Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘‘U.S., China must overcome mutual distrust,’’ CNN, April 10, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/10/opinion/lieberthal-/china-/us-/relations/index.html; and William Cohen, ‘‘The World Depends on U.S.-/China Cooperation: The two countries have many shared interests,’’ The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html. 46. For a skeptical critique of U.S. China policy see Aaron Friedberg, ‘‘Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy,’’ Foreign Affairs, September/October 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138032/aaron-/l-/friedberg/bucking-/beijing. 47. For a comprehensive assessment of responses in Asia to China’s rise, see Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman D. Levin, Julia F. Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and Somi Seong, Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG736. 48. For example, see Daniel Twining, ‘‘A Stronger Pivot,’’ Foreign Policy, November 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/05/a_stronger_pivot. 49. Michael Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,’’ op. cit. 50. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, ‘‘PLA Engineering Academy of Armored Forces,’’ speech in Beijing, China, September 19, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid/1723; National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, ‘‘President Obama’s Asia Policy & Upcoming Trip to Asia,’’ speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-/press-/office/2012/11/15/remarks-/national-/security-/advisor-/tom-/donilon-/prepared-/delivery. 51. Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit Outcomes,’’ The White House, Nov 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-/press-/office/2012/11/20/ fact-/sheet-/east-/asia-/summit-/outcomes. * * * Author’s Biographical Sketch 
Ely Stefansky Ratner was born in 1977, works in Washington as an associate political scientist with the RAND Corporation. He graduated magna cum laude from Princeton and received a master’s and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He is a son of Esther and Dr. Joseph Ratner of Carlisle, Mass. His mother is an assistant professor of Romance studies at Brandeis University in Waltham, Mass. His father is the chief of psychiatry at the New England Rehabilitation Hospital in Woburn, Mass. Dr. Ely Ratner is the Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. His research interests include U.S. national security strategy in Asia, China’s foreign relations in the region and the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. Dr. Ratner recently served in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. He was an International Affairs Fellow sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. His portfolio included China’s activities in and relations with North Korea, Japan, Burma, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Prior to joining the State Department, Dr. Ratner was an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he performed research and long-range analysis on the rise of China, the People’s Liberation Army and regional security in Asia. He previously worked in the U.S. Senate in the Office of Senator Joseph R. Biden, D-Del. and later as a Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His commentary and research have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Democracy, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Review, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle. Dr. Ratner is a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations and previously served as an IC Associate and a Research Fellow in the inaugural class of the National Asia Research Program. Dr. Ratner received his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley and his B.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where he graduated Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa. Dr. Ratner lives with his wife, Jennifer Lu Yang and son Ian in the Eastern Market neighborhood of Washington, D.C. They were married at Superior Court of the District of Columbia in Washington. Jennifer Lu Yang is studying for an M.B.A. at the University of Pennsylvania. She graduated from Stanford, California. / Каталог: groups -> 70928286 -> 2024131263 -> name groups -> PHẦn chuyển tiếp kính thưa quý vị và các bạn trẻ, giữa những ngưới Việt chúng ta, tôi nói groups -> Ý Nga sưu tầm và cập nhật hóa ngày 21-4-2013, với nhạc của nhạc sĩ: TừYên, Hà Thúc Sinh vừa thêm vào groups -> BÁo cáo môn: RÈn luyện nghiệp vụ SƯ phạM 3 groups -> Phản Bội hay Tự Do cho Việt Nam ? groups -> Tin khoa hoc december 31, 2010 Những vụ phóng vệ tinh thất bại trong 2010 Trong năm 2010, một số quốc gia đã vấp phải các sự cố trong việc phóng vệ tinh vào không gian groups -> Một Thời Bạn Học Revised 8/4/10 việt nam 70928286 -> THƯ viện online sách mới, sách đáng chú ý name -> Rebalance to asia with an insecure china tải về 187.56 Kb. Chia sẻ với bạn bè của bạn:
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