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inequality, all in the space of twenty years (see Figure 5.2). The gap
between rural and urban incomes (ossi
fied by the residential per-
mit system) has been increasing rapidly. While a
ffluent urban
dwellers drive BMWs, rural farmers are lucky to eat meat once a
week. Even more emphatic has been the increasing inequality
within both the rural and the urban sectors. Regional inequalities
have also deepened, with some of the southern coastal zone cities
surging ahead while the interior and the ‘rust belt’ of the northern
region have either failed to take o
ff or floundered badly.
48
Mere increases in social inequality constitute an uncertain indi-
cator of the reconstitution of class power. The evidence on this last
point is largely anecdotal and by no means secure. We can, how-
ever, proceed inferentially by looking
first at the situation at the
bottom of the social ladder. ‘In 1978 there were 120 million work-
ers in China. By 2000 there were 270 million. Adding the 70 mil-
lion peasants that have moved to the cities and found long-term
wage work, China’s working class now numbers approximately 350
million.’ Of these ‘more than 100 million’ are now employed in the
non-state sectors and are o
fficially categorized as wage labourers.
49
A large proportion of those employed in what is left of the state
sector (both SOEs and TVEs) in e
ffect have the status of wage
labourers also. There has, therefore, been a wholesale process of
proletarianization going on in China, marked by the stages of pri-
vatization and the steps taken to impose greater
flexibility on the
labour market (including the shedding of welfare and pension
obligations on the part of public enterprises). The government has
‘gutted’ services as well. According to China Labor Watch, ‘Rural
governments get almost no support from wealthier areas. They tax
local farmers and impose endless fees to
finance schools, hospitals,
road building, even the police.’ Poverty is intensifying among those
left behind even as growth roars ahead at 9 per cent. Between 1998
and 2002, 27 million workers were let go from SOEs as their num-
bers fell from 262,000 to 159,000. Even more surprising, the net
loss of manufacturing jobs in China over the past decade or so has
been around 15 million.
50
In so far as neoliberalism requires a large,
easily exploited, and relatively
powerless labour force, then China
certainly quali
fies as a neoliberal economy, albeit ‘with Chinese
characteristics’.
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