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mid-1990s on. Chinese businesses also invest overseas to secure
their position in foreign markets. Chinese television sets are now
being assembled in Hungary to assure access to the European mar-
ket and in North Carolina to assure access to the US. A Chinese
auto company plans to assemble cars and eventually build a factory
in Malaysia. Chinese companies are even investing in Paci
fic
region tourism to meet their own surging demand.
41
But in one respect the Chinese depart glaringly from the neolib-
eral template. China has massive labour surpluses, and if it is to
achieve social and political stability it must either absorb or vio-
lently repress that surplus. It can do the former only by debt-
financing infrastructural and fixed-capital formation projects on a
massive scale (
fixed-capital investment increased by 25 per cent in
2003). The danger lurks of a severe crisis of over-accumulation of
fixed capital (particularly in the built environment). Abundant
signs exist of excess production capacity (for example in auto-
mobile production and electronics) and a boom and bust cycle in
urban investments has already occurred. But all of this requires
that the Chinese state depart from neoliberal orthodoxy and act
like a Keynesian state. This requires that it maintain capital and
exchange rate controls. These are inconsistent with the global rules
of the IMF, the WTO, and the US Treasury. While China is
exempt from these rules as a transitional condition for WTO
membership, it cannot remain so in perpetuity. The enforcement
of capital
flow controls is becoming increasingly difficult as Chi-
nese yuan seep across a highly porous border via Hong Kong and
Taiwan into the global economy. It is worthwhile recalling that one
of the conditions that broke up the whole Keynesian post-war
Bretton Woods system was the formation of a eurodollar market as
US dollars escaped the discipline of its own monetary authorities.
42
The Chinese are already well on their way to replicating that
problem, and their Keynesianism is correspondingly threatened.
The Chinese banking system, which is at the heart of the cur-
rent de
ficit financing, cannot currently withstand integration into
the global
financial system because as much as half its loan port-
folio is non-performing. Fortunately, the Chinese have a balance of
payments surplus that can be applied, as we have already seen, to
wiping the banks’ slates clean. But it is at this point that the other
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