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By the mid-1990s, it became clear that China’s huge internal
market was becoming more and more attractive to foreign capital.
While only 10 per cent of the population may have possessed the
purchasing power of a nascent and growing middle class, 10 per
cent of more than a billion people constituted a huge internal
market. The competitive race was on to provide them with auto-
mobiles, mobile phones, DVDs, televisions, and washing
machines, as well as with shopping centres, highways, and ‘luxury’
homes. Monthly car production rose gradually from around
20,000 in 1993 to just over 50,000 in 2001, but thereafter leapt
upwards to nearly 250,000 monthly by mid-2004. A
flood of for-
eign investment –– everything from Wal-Mart and McDonald’s to
computer chip production –– poured into China in anticipation of
rapid future internal market growth, in spite of institutional
uncertainties, the uncertainties of state policy, and the evident
dangers of overcapacity.
30
The heavy reliance on FDI makes China a special case, very
di
fferent from Japan or South Korea. Chinese capitalism is not
well integrated as a result. Inter-regional trade is rather weakly
developed, even though there have been massive investments in
new means of communication. Provinces such as Guangdong trade
far more with the outside world than they do with the rest of
China. Capital does not
flow easily from one part of China to
another, in spite of a recent spate of merger activity and state-led
e
fforts to create regional alliances among different provinces.
31
Reliance on FDI will therefore diminish only to the extent that
resource allocation and capitalist interlinkages improve within
China itself.
32
China’s external trading relations have mutated over time, but
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