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through competitive uneven geographical developments, remains
to be seen.
The initial success of Deng’s strategy depended upon the Hong
Kong connection. As one of the
first of Asia’s ‘tiger’ economies,
Hong Kong was already a signi
ficant centre of capitalist dyna-
mism. Unlike the other states in the region (Singapore, Taiwan,
and South Korea), which resorted to high levels of state planning,
Hong Kong had developed in a more chaotic entrepreneurial way
without signi
ficant state guidance. It conveniently stood at the
centre of a Chinese business diaspora that already had signi
ficant
global connections. Hong Kong’s
manufacturing had developed
along labour-intensive and low-value-added lines (textiles being in
the lead). But by the late 1970s it was su
ffering from severe foreign
competition and acute labour shortages. Guangdong, just across
the border in China, had all the cheap labour in the world. Deng’s
opening therefore came as a godsend. Hong Kong capital seized
the opportunity. It took advantage of its many hidden connections
across the border into China, its function as an intermediary for
whatever foreign trade China already had, and its marketing net-
work into the global economy through which Chinese-made goods
could easily
flow.
As late as the mid-1990s, some two-thirds of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in China came through Hong Kong. And
although some of this was Hong Kong business expertise inter-
mediating for more diverse sources of foreign capital, there is no
question that the fortuitous fact of Hong Kong’s proximity was
critical to the developmental path that unfolded in China as a
whole. The provincial government’s economic development zone
in urban Shenzhen, for example, was unsuccessful in the early
1980s. What attracted the Hong Kong capitalists were the newly
created TVEs in rural areas. Hong Kong capital provided the
machinery, the inputs, and the marketing while the TVEs did the
work. Once established, this style of operation could be emulated
by other foreign capitalists (particularly Taiwanese, mainly around
Shanghai after it was opened up). The sources of FDI diversi
fied
greatly during the 1990s as Japanese
and South Korean as well as
US corporations began to use China as an o
ffshore production
centre in a big way.
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