The OmnI-ChAnnel eCOsysTem
6
that can drive consumers to visit stores, because of their loyalty to the brands or because they
want to experience and try items before purchasing them. For example, the recent addition of
Dyson products means that consumers can try out innovative hair dryers
and vacuum cleaners in
Best Buy stores.
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Furthermore, Best Buy invests heavily in training a knowledgeable, customer-
friendly sales force. To establish an omni-channel experience, the retailer lets consumers shop
for products across multiple platforms and buy according to their own preferred shopping com-
bination, whether that involves researching in store and buying online, or vice versa, or some
other combination of channels.
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Marketing Channel Actors
To be straightforward and avoid confusion, we identify
and define three key
entities involved in every marketing channel:
manufacturers,
intermediaries
(wholesale, retail, and specialized), and
end-users (business customers or consum-
ers). The presence or absence of a particular type of channel member is dictated
by its ability to perform the necessary channel functions in such a way that it
adds value. Sidebar 1.1 details an example from the tea industry in Taiwan that
showcases the value that an intermediary can provide.
SIDEBAR 1.1
Tea Selling in Taiwan: The Key Roles of Tea Intermediaries
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The Taiwanese tea industry got its start when tea trees imported from China got planted in the
Taiwanese hills in the mid-1800s. By the late 1920s, there were about 20,000 tea farmers in Taiwan,
who sold their product (so-called
crude tea) to one of about 60 tea intermediaries, who in turn
sold it to 280 tea refineries
located in Ta-tao-cheng, on the coast, ready for commercial sale and
exportation. The tea intermediaries traversed the hills of Taiwan to search for and buy tea then
bring it down to the dock to sell to refineries. But they also suffered a poor reputation among
both farmers and refineries. Intermediaries were accused of exploiting the market by buying low
and selling high; critics suggested that a simple direct trading system could be instituted to bypass
them completely.
Thus in 1923, the Governor-General of Taiwan set up a tea auction house in Ta-tao-cheng. Farmers
could ship their tea directly to the auction house,
where a first-price, sealed-bid auction would
determine the price refineries would pay to obtain their products. The auction house’s operating
costs were covered by farmers’ membership fees, trading charges, and subsidies by the Governor-
General, so the tea intermediaries suddenly had to compete with the auction house. Despite this
new and well-supported form of competition, the intermediaries not only survived, they ultimately
forced the closing of the auction house. But how could this outcome
arise if they were just
“exploiters” of the buy–sell situation? The answer is that they weren’t. They served key functions.
(continued)
The OmnI-ChAnnel eCOsysTem
7
First, the intermediaries
facilitated search in the marketplace. An intermediary would visit
many farms, finding tea to sell, which constituted an upstream search for product supply. With
the product supply in hand, the intermediary would take samples to a series of refineries and
ask for purchase orders. Visiting multiple refineries was necessary because the same variety and
quality of tea could fetch very different prices from different refineries, depending on the uses
to which they would put the tea. This search process repeated
every season, because each refin-
ery’s offer changed from season to season. The intermediaries thus found buyers for the farmers’
harvest and tea supplies for the refineries.
second, tea intermediaries performed various
sorting functions. Crude tea was highly het-
erogeneous; even the same species of tea tree, cultivated on different farms, exhibited wide
quality variations. Furthermore, 28 different species of tea trees grew in the Taiwanese hills!
The appraisal process, at both intermediary and refinery levels,
therefore demanded con-
siderable skill. Refineries hired specialists to appraise the tea they received; intermediaries
facilitated this process by
accumulating the tea harvests of multiple farmers into homogeneous
lots for sale.
Third, tea intermediaries
minimized the number of contacts in the channel system. With
20,000 tea farmers and 60 refineries, up to 1,200,000 contacts would be necessary for each
farmer to market the product to get the best refinery price (even if each farmer cultivated
only one variety of tea tree). Instead, each farmer tended to
sell to just one intermediary, such
that about 20,000 contacts existed at this first level of the channel. If the average intermediary
collected
n varieties of tea, and we assume that each of the 280 intermediaries negotiated,
on behalf of the farmers, with all 60 refineries, we find [60 × 280 ×
n] negotiations between
intermediaries and refineries. The total number of negotiations, throughout the channel, in
the presence of intermediaries thus was [20,000 + 16,800 ×
n], a value that exceeds 1,200,000
negotiations only if the number of tea varieties exceeded 70. But because there were only
about 25 tea varieties in Taiwan at the time, intermediaries reduced
the number of contacts
from more than 1 million to about 440,000.
such value-added activities had been completely ignored in the attacks made on the tea inter-
mediaries as “exploiters.” The resulting failure of the government-sanctioned and -subsidized
auction house suggests that, far from merely exploiting the market, tea intermediaries were
efficiency-enhancing market-makers. In this situation, the intermediation of the channel added
value and reduced costs at the same time.
In many cases, one channel member serves as the
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