Prosody in spontaneous humor: Evidence for encryption
63
independent of humor. That is, speakers did not seem to provide distinctive pro-
sodic signals that they were in fact ending a joke with a punch line. This result
is especially interesting given the semi-scripted nature of the productions. Even
with a stereotypical expectation of joke-telling behavior, people failed to produce
highly stereotyped utterances to mark their humor.
These results, albeit limited, suggest that one-to-one mappings between speech
characteristics and humor are not common in everyday talk. Research examining
how people signal ironic intent in spontaneous conversation also shows that rather
than using some stereotyped form to communicate irony (often a form of hu-
morous speech), speakers rather tend to contrast prosodic features quite variably
(Attardo 2001; Bryant and Fox Tree 2005; Bryant 2010, 2011). Vocal strategies for
communicating subtle meanings likely depend on many complex social factors,
and the acoustic form speakers choose to adopt will vary according to the prag-
matic function in a given communicative context. From this perspective, speech
acts are strategic signals in a context of cooperation and conflict (Pinker, Nowak,
and Lee 2008).
The encryption theory of humor (Flamson and Barrett 2008) maintains that
humor is produced by encrypting multiple implicatures within an utterance that
can only be understood by audience members who share relevant background
information (including attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, in addition to propo-
sitional knowledge). When an audience member has access to this background
information, he or she is able to “decrypt” the hidden implicature(s) — that is, they
“get” the joke. This hypothesis builds on a relevance theoretic model of inferential
communication (Sperber and Wilson 1995), and predicts that the explicit marking
of humor will depend largely on context and audience composition (see also Clark
and Schaefer 1987; Yus 2003). In contexts where people are particularly motivated
to appeal to as many audience members as possible, they would be expected to
mark their humor production in a variety of ways to facilitate the detection of
encrypted content, and thereby enhance the breadth of audience members that
would be able to detect their similarity with the speaker. Conversely, in contexts
where speakers are motivated to solicit pre-existing ties, they would not be ex-
pected to mark humor, highlighting the depth of similarity with those audience
members who manage to detect the encryption.
We examined spontaneous humor production
in a community setting
amongst individuals with long standing social ties. Based on the encryption the-
ory of humor, we expected that there would be relatively little explicit marking of
jokes in this specific context. The goals of most speakers revolved around official
business of a cooperative work organization, and in this capacity, most speakers
were highlighting depth of similarity with close social allies. When encrypting
information, speakers should not provide disambiguating information to those
64 Thomas Flamson, Gregory A. Bryant, and H. Clark Barrett
without an ability to decrypt the information, and thus,
laughter can honestly
reveal possession of relevant implied information (i.e., a key). As described be-
low, we explored the acoustic features of speech containing humor and looked for
measurable changes in speech prosody (i.e., prosodic contrasts), and we expected
that the amount and nature of prosodic contrasts between punch lines and set-up
information would be comparable to contrasts between set-up speech and speech
immediately preceding it (baseline).
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