IV. Monetary Policy Operation Framework—The Central Bank’s
Operation Method to Withdraw Liquidity
Under a structural deficit liquidity management framework, due to the insti-
tutional liquidity deficit arrangement, the required reserves system will auto-
matically create an increasing demand for reserves; therefore, the central bank
seldom faces a liquidity surplus situation. We could easily come to the con-
clusion that under the structural deficit liquidity management framework,
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Reforms in China’s Monetary Policy
the main reason for the long-term liquidity surplus is an excessive increase in
liquidity supply by spontaneous factors (see Figure 1.4 ). Among spontaneous
factors, what can increase in the long run is the change in the central bank’s
net foreign assets. In reality, the occurrence of liquidity surplus and foreign
exchange intervention by the central bank in a developed country are usually
connected with each other. The “sterilization” by the central bank to keep a
stable level of liquidity usually refers to local currency operations undertaken
to hedge foreign exchange intervention. Most developed countries adopt a
floating exchange rate system, and the central bank will intervene in the for-
eign exchange market to a relatively small extent. Therefore, liquidity sur-
plus is not likely to occur. Only a central bank that intervenes in the foreign
exchange market over the long term has to deal with sterilization.
23
For exam-
ple, the Bank of Japan has intervened in the foreign exchange market over a
long period, mainly by purchasing US dollars to suppress appreciation of the
yen and therefore injecting a large amount of liquidity via foreign exchange
intervention. The Bank of Japan has set targets for increasing commercial
banks’ balances in accounts held at the central bank, which is in the same
direction of injecting liquidity via foreign exchange intervention. However,
due to the relatively large amount of foreign exchange interventions, the Bank
of Japan faces pressure to withdraw part of the liquidity. For a central bank
that has not adopted a structural deficit liquidity management framework,
liquidity surplus may come from the structural liquidity surplus caused by
institutional arrangements or from the liquidity supply impact due to change
in spontaneous factors. The operation methods available for a central bank to
withdraw liquidity are analyzed below on a basis of common sense.
To reduce liquidity surplus, the central bank can reduce the supply of
liquidity or increase the demand for liquidity. We first analyze the operation
methods to reduce the supply of liquidity. Reducing the supply of liquidity
as shown on the central bank balance sheet can be divided into two methods:
selling assets and increasing liabilities other than reserves.
24
Asset sales include
sales of foreign exchange reserves, withdrawing relending and rediscount
facilities, sales of bonds in the open market, and temporary sales of bonds
under repo agreements (hereinafter referred to as “repo”). The main method
for increasing other liabilities is to issue central bank bonds, etc.
From the operations of central banks in developed countries and emerging
countries, if the central bank wants to withdraw a temporary liquidity sur-
plus (usually an overnight liquidity surplus) in the banking system resulting
from prediction error, it will mainly use repos. This situation is very rare. For
example, the Federal Reserve conducted only ten overnight repos in 2001,
the Bank of England conducted only one repo in 2002, and the Bank of
Japan seldomly conducted repo. The repo balance of in the balance sheets of
Monetary Theory
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57
central banks in developed countries is basically zero. Given this situation, it
is much easier for the central bank to sell bonds from time to time under repo
agreements, and central bank bond issuance is subject to a shortest bond term
restriction. The central bank cannot, therefore, issue short-term bills to hedge
overnight liquidity surplus.
If liquidity needs to be withdrawn in the short or medium-to-long term,
the main method is to issue central bank bonds.
25
For example, the Bank of
Japan issues a large amount of short-term Bank of Japan bills to conduct regular
liquidity withdrawal operations. The Bank of Japan auctions Bank of Japan
bills three times a day, and by September 2002, it had issued central bank bills
totaling JPY4.39 trillion. Since the establishment of the Euro zone, the ECB
has not faced liquidity surplus. However, the ECB regards the issuance of short-
term central bank bills as the preferred option among operation methods to
withdraw liquidity under its monetary policy operation framework and regards
such bills as top-grade assets that can be used as eligible collateral for monetary
policy operations in the euro system. The Bank of Korea has long used mon-
etary stabilization bonds to absorb liquidity.
26
At the end of the 1980s, to with-
draw the liquidity surplus caused by capital inflow, the Bank of Korea issued
a large amount of monetary stabilization bonds with a maximum balance of
KRW24.44 trillion, accounting for 21.8 percent of the M2 balance.
Central banks of developed countries usually purchase bonds when they
inject liquidity over the long term but rarely sell bonds to withdraw liquidity.
In fact, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan and other central
banks have barely sold any bonds.
Central banks lack the motivation to sell bonds, the reason behind which
is the same as the reason why central banks are inclined to hold more bonds—
central banks reduce excess deposit reserves in liabilities when selling bond
assets, simultaneously bringing about a decrease in the scale of their assets and
liabilities. The total assets in a country’s financial system will increase contin-
uously, and the shrinking of the scale of central bank’s assets and the declining
of the share of the central banks’ assets in the society’s total financial assets
will weaken the influence of the central bank, which will negatively influence
the central bank’s ability to control and regulate the financial system. Besides,
the central bank is reluctant to sell bonds for the following reasons:
(1) The liquidity withdrawal via sale of bonds by the central bank means
it has to sell bonds on a large scale. Such bond sell-off will obviously
impact the financial market and bring about great fluctuation in
prices, which will therefore affect public confidence.
(2) The central bank’s sell-off will lead to violent fluctuations in prices,
meaning that if the central bank wants to realize the expected sales
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Reforms in China’s Monetary Policy
volume, it has to bear considerable loss on the price. Moreover, if
market confidence is seriously eroded, no buyers will be attracted by
such bonds and the quantitative operating target of the central bank
will be very difficult to realize. Therefore, it is usually very difficult
for the central bank to withdraw liquidity by selling bonds on a large
scale.
(3) The central bank occupies an important position in bond purchases,
and if it regards bond sales as a major operating instrument, then the
influence of the central bank on bond market prices and the yield
curve will be too large, which will affect the price formation mecha-
nism of the bond market and therefore reduce market efficiency.
In sum, if reducing the supply of liquidity to eliminate liquidity surplus, the
central bank will issue bonds as its main method, in addition to short-term
sales of bonds under repo agreements. To cope with the liquidity surplus, it
may increase the demand for liquidity, that is, increase the required reserve
ratio. In practice, central banks prefer to make adjustments to the liabilities
structure to reduce liquidity surplus. Issuing central bank bonds and increas-
ing the required reserve ratio are both reflected on the liabilities side of the
central bank balance sheet. Therefore, the author puts forward the concept
of the central bank liabilities spectrum and compares these two instruments
under this concept.
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