Reforms in China’s Monetary Policy Reforms in China’s Monetary


Structural Liquidity Deficit and the Monetary Policy



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Reforms in China’s monetary policy a frontbencher’s perspective (Sun, Guofeng) (Z-Library)

Structural Liquidity Deficit and the Monetary Policy 
Operating Framework
12

I. Introduction 
The monetary policy transmission mechanism under an indirect monetary 
policy operating framework is as follows: the trading activity of the central 
bank changes its balance sheet before influencing the balance sheets of com-
mercial banks, which indirectly influences the general public’s income and 
expenditure and ultimately achieves the monetary policy objective. In this 
transmission process, reserves
13
are liabilities of the central bank and assets of 
commercial banks, serving as a bridge connecting the central bank balance 
sheet and those of commercial banks. They therefore become the target of 
monetary policy operations by the central bank,
14
and the central bank mon-
etary policy operations are directly reflected in liquidity management. 
To be precise, the liquidity management of the central bank refers to the 
central bank using a framework composed of a series of tools and rules to 
adjust bank reserves to an appropriate level and thereby control the price 
of reserves (i.e., short-term interest rates) and the ultimate monetary pol-
icy objective (e.g., price stability). Poole’s (1970) famous thesis is the first 
to clearly differentiate the central bank liquidity management theory from 
macroeconomic researches, stating that liquidity management is at the end 
of the monetary policy implementation. The minimum assumption is that 
the only information channel between the macroeconomy and the liquid-
ity management is the operating target of the central bank (e.g., the over-
night interbank lending rate). Moreover, it is further assumed that within a 
very short recognizable period, the influence of macroeconomic fluctuations 


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Reforms in China’s Monetary Policy
in the central bank’s targets may be realized only through changes in the 
decision-making of the central bank. In other words, during such a period, 
only if the central bank can adjust its target variables based on its assess-
ment of the macroeconomy can the macroeconomic volatility affect such 
variables; otherwise, the macroeconomic volatility will not directly influence 
the equilibrium relationship among these variables. Studies of the central 
bank liquidity management conducted after that of Poole pay more attention 
to short-term macro-economic strategies of central banks instead of focusing 
more on the actual implementation of monetary policy or really addressing 
the core concerns of central banks. In recent years, central banks in differ-
ent countries have made relatively significant progress in the study of liquid-
ity management. Ulrich (2000) considers that the liquidity management 
includes the liquidity management environment and the monetary policy 
operating framework. The liquidity management environment includes three 
elements: a highly efficient interbank money market, the predictability of 
automatic factors,
15
and an inability among market participants to anticipate 
perfectly changes in the central bank’s operating target. The two most impor-
tant factors in the monetary policy operating framework are the monetary 
policy instrument table and the required reserves system. The former refers to 
how the central bank has a sufficiently wide scope of open market operation 
instruments, and the latter means the required reserve ratio is sufficient to 
offset fluctuations in automatic factors. 
Literature review undertaken by Chinese scholars on the central bank 
liquidity management is almost nonexistent. In their opinions, the objec-
tives of study on monetary policy transmission are not reserves. Thus these 
scholars focus on the monetary base and mainly use the money multiplier 
to analyze the transmission mechanism between the monetary base and the 
money, and ignore the supply and demand relationship of the monetary 
base. The monetary theory provides that: money quantity = monetary base ×
money multiplier. This equation is an identity, which in mathematical terms 
is but a definition. Therefore, this equation is actually a definition of the 
money multiplier. The monetary theory divides decisions on the quantity 
of money into the monetary base and the money multiplier in the form of 
an identity, the purpose of which is to illustrate that central banks’ liabilities 
support deposit money (the liabilities of commercial banks). Because such 
liabilities are the monetary base, the concepts of the monetary base and the 
money multiplier mainly serve to explain the basic principles underlying 
the central bank’s monetary management. However, from an analytical or 
operational perspective, dividing the quantity of money into the monetary 
base and the money multiplier does not constitute an effective analytical 
framework. 


Monetary Theory

43
(1) The monetary base is not an appropriate operational target. In prac-
tice, not all liabilities of the central bank can affect money creation activi-
ties of commercial banks. The creation of money by commercial banks is 
subject only to reserves held by commercial banks. Thus, in monetary policy 
operations and the achievement of targets, liquidity should be the objective 
of study. In addition, the monetary base, defined as the central bank’s lia-
bilities, includes not only reserves but also government deposits, deposits of 
other institutions, central bank bonds, etc. If changes in liabilities other than 
reserves do not affect reserves, they will not have any influence on the cre-
ation of money. Hence, changes in the monetary base are inconsistent with 
changes in reserves, even in opposite directions. Taking the monetary base as 
the object of study and the operating target will therefore lead to confusion. 
If we take account of this distinction and amend the definition of the mon-
etary base by narrowing its scope, then the definition of the monetary base 
will be reduced to the concept of reserves, and the concept of the monetary 
base will be equivalent to that of reserves. This narrowing of the concept is 
thus meaningless and distorts the meaning of the monetary base as liabilities 
of the central bank. 
(2) Analyzing the monetary transmission relationship by focusing on the 
money multiplier is too simplified. Dividing the quantity of money into the 
monetary base and the money multiplier changes the target of monetary 
policy operations to the monetary base. Moreover, by doing so, the passively 
defined “money multiplier” reflects the complex transmission relationship 
from liabilities of the central bank to liabilities of commercial banks, which 
cannot reflect commercial banks’ reaction to the central bank’s monetary 
policy. But such reaction is the key to understanding the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism of the central bank. Under the monetary base—
money multiplier analytical framework—researchers usually assume the 
money multiplier remains unchanged, which is far away from reality, or 
break down the money multiplier into several elements such as the cash 
deposit ratio, which does not encompass the willingness and behaviors of 
commercial banks. It is therefore static and cannot dynamically reflect the 
process by which the monetary policy is transmitted in the banking sys-
tem. Sun Guofeng (1996) states that the monetary policy transmission of 
the central bank is not a simple unidirectional process and that the mutual 
influence of the supply and demand relationship on the monetary base and 
money levels must be considered, and he establishes a model by which cen-
tral bank operations are transmitted to the monetary base and then to money 
and the real economy via the supply and demand relationship. Therefore, 
liquidity management means the central bank needs not only to pay atten-
tion to and control the actual aggregate reserves but also to change the ratio 


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Reforms in China’s Monetary Policy
between reserves demand and reserves supply via monetary policy operations 
to alter the activities of commercial banks and realize the monetary policy 
target. Between the two stages of monetary policy transmission (reserves and 
money), the variable the central bank can directly control is reserves, and the 
demand function for commercial bank reserves and the supply function for 
commercial bank money have an inverse function relationship. Therefore, 
the system for analyzing the demand and supply of reserves established by 
the liquidity management framework is a model that can be directly oper-
ated and applied by the central bank, which puts the activities of commer-
cial banks and the elements of money demand and supply at the forefront 
of reserves demand. In that case, the monetary policy transmission process 
in these two stages can to some extent be concentrated into a model of the 
reserves supply and demand relationship, which makes the analysis of mon-
etary policy operations more simple and efficient.

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