Part 1: introduction rationale


Linguistic realizations of hedging



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2.5. Linguistic realizations of hedging

The earliest studies into hedging were limited to a fairly narrow selection of linguistic expressions. For instance, only about 70 different items were listed in Lakoff’s paper. More recently, numerous linguistic phenomena have been associated with hedging; there nevertheless is no absolute uniformity between studies as to which linguistic phenomena should be regarded as falling within the category. Literature relating to hedging seems to suggest that hedges are linguistic choices that include an inherent component of fuzziness, providing the opportunity to comment on group membership, truth value and illocutionary force. However, there is variation between studies as to the actual items treated as hedges. In some studies, as in the case with Prince et al’s paper, the phenomena treated as hedges are not described very thoroughly. In other studies, the focus is on a specific linguistic feature, not the broad range of alternatives available for hedging. Hedges are sometimes listed as a number of items used for rounding numerical data, including items like: about, approximately, close to and in that round. While certain studies face with a specific linguistic phenomenon, others have attempted to cover a wider range. Studying hedging in new writing is drawn attention to an array of devices. How vagueness in presenting a list of other items typically used as hedges is firstly discussed. Most of the items on the list are verbal or adverbial expressions that involve different degrees of probability or otherwise play down the responsibility of the sender as concerns propositional content. The main categories consist of auxiliaries (e.g. may, might, can, could), semi-auxiliaries (appear, seem), full verb (suggest), the passive voice, various adverbs and adverbial (probably, almost, relatively), some adjectives (probable), indefinite nouns and pronouns.


Similar items are also mentioned by Makannen and Schoder (1985) that modal verbs and particles, the use of some pronouns and even the avoidance of others, agentless passive, other impersonal expressions, and certain vocabulary choices may be seen as central manifestations of hedging in English and German. Skelton points out that there are a very large number of ways in which one can hedge in English, including impersonal phrases, the system of modal expressions, verbs like seem, look and appear, introductory phrase like I think, the suffix –ish in connection with certain adjectives and so on.
While there are clearly numerous ways in which hedging may be realized in English, it is obvious that there are certain evident types of linguistic expression the spring to mind in this respect. As noted earlier, in the seminal work by Lakoff (1973), hedging was first approached with reference to a relatively limited set of hedges, including lexical items and phrases such as: roughly, sort of, strictly speaking, etc. In the course of time, the concept of hedging has come to be understood more broadly as including a numbers of ways of expressing uncertainty, vagueness, hesitation, and the like, that is, to cover various linguistic manifestations of feelings and thoughts. Here comes the overview of categories of hedges, all the details will be expressed later. First of all, the author would like to mention one of hedging devices-it’s modal auxiliaries, consisting of eight different modal auxiliaries, namely can, could, may, might, must, should, will, would.

It may/ might/ can/ could well be true that he beat her.



Full verbs are indeed used as hedges such as: believe, appear, assume, suggest, propose, imply, tend, imagine, reckon, seem.

I don’t believe he knew me.

In addition, we have adjectives used as hedges (potential, possible, likely, common, normal, usual, slight, and substantial); nouns as: likelihood, possibility, prospect, tendency, prediction, guess, hope, inclination” and adverbs: “usually, slightly, almost, generally, likely, apparently, potentially, somewhat, greatly, frequently, nearly, approximately”.

I almost resigned.

It can’t be denied that clause element also plays as hedges:

If my memory doesn’t fail me

As far as I know/ as you know

I may be mistaken but I think

I’m not sure if it’s right but

I guess/ think ……

Since I’ve been wondering …..

From linguistic realizations of hedging above, many researchers have basis to clarify hedges.



Classification

Prince/ Fader/ Bosk

F
Within propositional content


rom the viewpoint of discourse analysis Prince et al start from Lakoff’s definition of hedges as devices that make things fuzzy, but add that there are at least two kinds of fuzziness. One is fuzziness within the proposition content, the other fuzziness “in the relationship between the prepositional content and the speaker that is speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition conveyed” (Prince/ Fader/ Bosk, 1982: 85). Hedges were mainly discovered in the discourse that was related to the physicians’ uncertainty in the medical-technical domain.


Fuzziness



In the relationship between the propositional content and the speaker


Accordingly, there are two types of hedges; one is called approximator affecting the truth-conditions of propositions.



His feet were sort of blue.
Approximator

And shield, reflects the degree of the speaker’s commitment to the truth-value of the whole proposition, not affecting the truth-conditions.



I think his feet were blue.

Shield

Hubler

A similar distinction is distinguished by Hubler (1983) between what he calls understatements and hedges although both are devices used for expressing “indetermination”. For example, the following sentence is indeterminate.

It’s a bit cold in here.
However, according to Hubler, there are two kinds of indetermination: phrastic and neustic.

Phrastic indetermination concerns the propositional content of a sentence




Indetermination



Neustic indetermination is connected with the claim to validity of the proposition a speaker makes





Thus, this sentence contains an understatement



It is a bit cold in here

Understatement

While the following consists of a hedge

It is cold in Alaska, I suppose

Hedge
Hubler’s division thus greatly resembles what are called approximators and shields by Prince/ Fader/ Bosk. Hubler himself admits that both understatements and hedges perform the same function of expressing indetermination, of making sentences more acceptable to H and thus increasing their chances of ratification.



2.6. Hedging before giving bad news

2.6.1. Giving bad news as a speech act

Types of illocutionary acts are distinguished by types of illocutionary intents (intended illocutionary effects). For example, to inform someone of something is not only to express a belief in it but also to express one’s intention that H believes it.


According to the theory of speech acts of Austin, Richard, Yule…, like any other speech activities, giving bad news is produced as a speech act, namely, an act of announcing, disclosing, informing, reporting, advising performed via an utterance by participants in interaction. Giving bad news is an illocutionary act. Like most illocutionary acts, it is “in some sense the inherent function of the speech acts, which might be established, by simply looking at the act itself in relation to existing beliefs” (Hudson, 1990: 111). Much taxonomy of illocutionary acts has been proposed but we will not discuss or compare all of them. Austin’s original scheme (1962, lecture XII) included a rich variety of illocutionary act type but as Searl (1975) has argued that there are no clear principles by which Austin collected them into his five classes. All subsequent taxonomies are attempted improvements on Austin’s. Its category should satisfy the criteria for scheme’s blades of classification must be tied to some systematic account of illocutionary acts. Let us look at the following suggestions of some famous authors on the speech act classification in order to find out the position of the speech act of giving bad news in language use in context
According to Austin, they are divided into four types: explosives, exercitives, behaveties and commisives.
Similarly, Searl suggests five types, namely:

_ Representatives: tell people how and what things are. A representative can be tested either true or false as the speaker asserts, says, reports, informs, suggests, doubts, denies and so on.

_ Directives: get the H to do something by using suggestions, requests, commands, etc.

_ Commissives: commit the S to do something such as promises, threats, etc.

_ Declaratives: bring about changes in the world

_ Expressives: express feelings and attitudes about a certain state of affairs, for instance, to apologize, regret, thank, etc.


Bach and Harnish (1979: 41) also suggest the following four subdivisions of illocutionary acts, which are basically the same as the ones of Austin and Searl and the position of giving bad news can be easy seen as follows:

Communicative illocutionary acts

I

II

III

IV

Constatives

Assertives

Predictives

Retrodictives

Descriptives

Informatives

Confirmatives

Concessives

Retractives

Assentives

Dissentives

Dispulatives

Responsives

Suggestives

Supportives



Directives

Requestives

Questions

Requirements

Prohibitives

Permissives

Advisories


Commissives

Promises


Offers

Acknowledgement

Apologize

Condole

Congratulate



Greet

Thank


Bid

Accept


Reject

As can be seen in the table, giving bad news is recognized from the Constative column, which expresses the S’s belief and his intention or desire that the H has a form or continues to hold a like belief. Informatives simply consist of such items as: advise, announce, apprise, disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, testify. What distinguishes informative from simple assertives is that the speaker expresses (in addition to his belief) the intention that the H forms the belief that P. For assertives, S expressed intention is that H forms the belief, or continues to believe that P. We might say that the time of utterance, S presumes that H does not believe that P. Here we rely on a notion of illocutionary presumption in his illocutionary intention.


2.6.2. Hedging as a device

As Brown and Levinson (1987) illustrate, hedging can also be used to tone down the force of for example request, as in “Give me a hand, if you can”. In such cases, one might even say that the reservation included in the hedge may be seen as a way out for the addressee in case he or she in fact is not in a position to help, the hedge thus signaling the conditions under which the request may be disregarded by the addressee. As work by Stubbs (1986) and Markkanen and Schroder (1982) illustrate, hedging may be taken to involve lexical items, propositions and illocutionary forces. While distinguishing between hedges of these three types is illuminating in theoretical terms, it seems that the distinction between them is not always clear-cut.


G.Lakoff who drew attention to the theoretical importance of the phenomenon also reports R. Lakoff’s observation that certain verbs and syntactic construction convey hedged performative that is, they modify the force of speech act. They can also be studied as Hedges on illocutionary force. It is performative hedges in particular that are most important linguistic means of satisfying the S’s wants. Such hedges may be analyzed as adverbs on performative verbs that present the illocutionary force of the sentence.
In the first place, operations are syntactically done in English with tags or with expressions like: “I wonder”. These markers are called “Appealers” by N.Quang

It was cold, wasn’t it?

Do me a favor, will you?

I wonder if (you know whether)…….

Sometimes performative hedges are encoded on words or particles which may also hedge propositional content.

He really did run that way

I tell you sincerely he ran that way

I tell you he certainly ran that way

These examples above illustrate that adverbs on higher performatives may be lowered into an embedded position in their complement sentences, hence the ambiguity as to what is being modified.


Brown and Levinson (1987) divided particles which hedge illocutionary force into “strengthener” those that mainly act as emphatic hedges: “exactly”, “precisely”, “emphatically” and “weakeners” those that soften or tentativize what they modify. Nevertheless, the author only investigates weakeners mentioned above in the scope of the study because of the suitability to the topic of the thesis “Hedging before giving bad news”.

Weakening particles is to use adverbs as: “really, sincerely, and just”



Sincerely, the more I hear about your husband, the less I like him.

That’s just true.

The tentativizers: “perhaps, maybe, I wonder” which seem often to indicate the presence of an implicature are ways of avoiding FTAs.

It looks good, but maybe, this job does not suit you.

Có vẻ tốt lắm nhưng có lẽ công việc này không phù hợp với anh đâu.

Dubitative particles: “I guess/ I think/ I suppose …..” suspend the felicity condition on assertions that the S knows what he says to be true: “You are sad, I guess”.

As we can see above, the felicity condition dubitative particles suspend is the sincerity condition so that S is not claiming to be doing the speech act he appears to be doing or doesn’t take responsibility for the truth of his assertion.
In the second place, Heringer (1972:55) describes a set of illocutionary force hedges that consist of the expression of a felicity condition in an “if clause”

Catch me if you can

“If you can” in the above example pragmatically functions as hedges on the force of the speech act. Here comes the other phrases of “if clause”.

I wonder if/ I wonder whether ……..

…………if I may ask you?

…………if you don’t mind?

…………if you want/ you can?

If you allow me ……………..

If you are already …………...

Another level of phenomena is presented by “you know”, “you see”, “I mean”, “as it were”, “in all possibility”, “it seems to me”.

I was coming out of the door, you know when I mean I saw him standing there, waiting.

From the contrary-to-expectation sense one moves naturally to a commiservative usage which softens the FTA of conveying bad news and which we can gloss as: “I’m afraid”, “I’m sorry”.

He’s left, I’m afraid.

I’m sorry, he didn’t come.

FTA source for implicatures are “sort of, kind of, a mere” and “a little bit, just a little bit” serves notice of reluctance impinge.

I sort of hate to say this but ……..

The fish is great, but a little bit salty.

Món cá này rất ngon nhưng hơi mặn một chút (Vietnamese)

Or indicate a co-operative avoidance of positive disagreement.

I really sort of think.

There are phrases which have distribution predicable essentially on pragmatic rather than semantic grounds but which are transparently related to literal meanings that already have hedging functions.
In his reply to Ross (1970) and G. Lakoff, Fraser (1972) notes apparent counter examples to the claim that the performative verb must be the highest verb in surface structure.

I regret that I must inform you of your dismissal.

I am pleased to be able to offer you the job.

I would like to congratulate you.
Since on our view performativity is indirect even in explicit performative utterances, these sorts of sentence offer no special problems for our account. Embedding increases the inferential load on the H, but there is no difference in kind between performative utterances with embedded and those with embedded performative verbs. Sadok (1974: 55-61) has in effect argued against the indirectness of these cases and Fraser (1975) has gone on to investigate sentences like these in some detail under the label of hedged performatives.
Fraser (1975) has discussed the interesting cases of utterances that differ from simple performative utterances in the performative verbs preceded by a modal like “must”, “can”, “will”, “would”, “might”, “should” or semi modal such as “have to”. Such utterances seem to have the illocutionary force of the act named by the performative verb used, as illustrated by typical utterances of sentences like these:

I must ask you to leave

I can promise you will be home.

I want to thank you for the Beaujolais.

I would suggest you try some.
Fraser is concerned both to account for their illocutionary force in terms of certain conventional principles, and to account for cases (weak performative) that do not have the force of the act named by the performative verb, such as: “I must forbid you from cutting off your right arm”. Fraser seems to assume (he says nothing explicity) that simple performatives do not pose the same explanatory problem as hedged performatives. Since he indicates nothing to the contrary, presumably he thinks that simple performatives are literal and direct illocutionary acts and therefore that they have their illocutionary force.
For hedged performatives, like standardized indirect acts generally, there is ample precedent for the inference the H is intended to make, consequently the SAS is short-circuited. What distinguishes direct performatives and hedged performatives from illocutionary standardization generally is that the illocutionary verb explicitly occurs in the utterance. Thus the H’s search procedure, even if such utterances lacked precedent, would be simple and short. In reviewing the other main cases of hedged performatives, we will give brief versions of the inference required in accordance with the maxim of sufficient reason.
According to Fraser, hedged performatives with “can” generally require some adverbial like “now”, “finally” or “at last” to count as the sort of illocutionary act named by the performative verb.

I can now admit that I did

Such an adverbial is not necessary, however, as shown by example repeated here:



I can promise you will be home.

The hedged performatives with “would”, “might”, “should” are interesting because grammatically they seem to be consequence of subjunctive conditionals without any expressed antecedent. A sentence like this might be construed as an elliptical version of a conditional with an antecedent like “If you were to ask my opinion”.



I would suggest a short of Irish whiskey.

Finally, Fraser claims that for each kind of hedged performative only certain sorts of illocutionary verbs work performatively with the modal (or other expression) in question. The following, for example, are clearly not acts of the sort named by the performative verb.



I must invite you to say.

I can (now) ask you to go

I will order you to sit down.

However, it is not the verb itself but the verb together with its complement that determines whether an utterance of a sentence in normal circumstances has the illocutionary force designated by the verb. The following examples, with the same verbs as in these examples, seem to have that illocutionary force:



I must invite you to another one of those horrible parties at the boss’s house.

I can (now) ask you to turn up the radio-the kids are asleep finally.

I will order you never to come back until I tell you to.

In each case the hedged form has the illocutionary force named by the verb because the utterance meets the conditions that hedged performatives of that sort need. Hedged performatives with “must” are acts that the S is reluctant to do. Those with “can” imply that the conditions were not right previously vat is now. Those with “will” imply that the S was not previously willing or that a certain condition is assumed under which he is willing. And so on for other cases. The point is that performativity, simple or hedged, is not a question of semantics. The only question about the acceptability of a performative reading of sentences used performatively, that is, to perform an act (indirectly in our view) of the sort named by the performative verb. When such a sentence is so used on a given occasion, no special reading is required to explain that use.


2.6.3. Hedging strategies in giving bad news

As mentioned earlier, hedging can be seen as a politeness strategy, in this part, the writer would like to discuss and then suggest some possible hedging strategies used to save S and H’s face in reducing the weightiness of face risks or face threats.


The following classification of hedging derives from the perspective of pragmatics or politeness strategies. First, it is based on Hyland’s (1998) polypragmatic paradigm which is composed of speaker-oriented, hearer-oriented, and content-oriented. Second, it comes from House and Kasper’s (1981) typology of politely linguistic tools and Holmes’ notion of hedges realized in the light of polite language. Finally, it is essentially background by Brown and Levinson’s (1987) paradigm of politeness strategies.
Strategy 1: Showing tentativeness and mitigation

In this strategy, S assumes that what follows hedges can be wrong, i.e. S’s knowledge about who is given bad news, his information could be unilateral or one-sided. In the meantime, S also wants to show his lack if confidence what is said. That is why S should be as much tentative as possible in communicating the content to the H and the content must be open for H’s decision.



  1. Theo tôi biết nhiều thứ đánh mất không cách gì lấy lại được. Hình như cô ấy không còn yêu anh nữa rồi. (Lost has been lost and nothing as far as I can see has been gained. She seems not love you any more).

  2. I could pet her and spoil her that as I wanted to pet you. But she wasn’t like you. She loved me. It was blessing that I could take the love you did not want and give it to her….When she went, she took everything. (Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the wind: 1005).

  3. Observe my hand, my dear. I could tear you in pieces with them with no trouble what so over and I would do it if it would take Ashley out of your mind. But it wouldn’t… (Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the wind: 914)

  4. You are cracked about June. I can tell you one thing …. that she has the Buccaneer in tow, she doesn’t care two pence about you. (J.Galsworthy, The man of property: chapter 5)

  5. Không biết là anh có biết không em đã nói với bản thân mình là em sẽ quên anh và em sẽ rời xa anh mãi mãi. (Thế giới Phụ nữ, số 35/ 2003)

  6. Tôi kiểu như (sort of) cũng khó chịu lắm. Nhưng thôi, cái chuyện quá nhăng nhít của anh ấy cũng mặc anh ấy thôi, miễn là đừng bỏ vợ bỏ con để đi theo cái con ranh kiểu như (sort of) mắt xanh mỏ đỏ ấy là được rồi.

  7. Anh có biết rằng khi anh ra đi anh đã để lại cho em biết bao nỗi buồn không? Nay anh quay về với em nhưng lòng em đã khép rồi anh ạ. (Thế giới Phụ nữ, số 29/ 2003)


Strategy 2: Self-abasing/ Self-blaming

This strategy of self-abasement or self-blame inclines to the idea that using hedges in this strategy, the S wishes to show his modesty and humbleness in letting the H know about his intention. S in this case realizes that his utterance can be an annoyance to some extent. For example:



  1. Hỏi khí không phải, năng lực của anh đã đủ thầu dự án này chưa nhỉ?

  2. Em mang tội với anh nhiều lắm nhưng biết nói làm sao được em không thể không ra đi. (I may be mistaken but I cannot stay here)

  3. This may not be appropriate but I have to tell the truth: I’m not fond of you.


Strategy 3: Talking up

This strategy is closely related to strategy 2. The use of this strategy points out that S wants to deliberately and implicitly flatter H’s status in order to decrease threats to H, hence not to make H hurt when hearing the following negative comments from S.



  1. Nếu tớ mà là cậu, tớ sẽ không nhận làm công việc quá vất vả thế đâu.

  2. Xinh đẹp và hiểu biết như cậu thế này mà lại yêu anh chàng lêu lổng thất nghiệp đấy à?


Strategy 4: Apologizing

Possibly due to the fact that S is not sure about the accuracy of what he is saying, he must apologize before giving the bad news. In this case, S also shows that he is reluctant to do such a thing that he should not have done.



  1. I sort of hate to say this but I have to let you know your aunt is suffering from fatal disease.

  2. I’m sorry; all I know is this work doesn’t suit you.

  3. I don’t want to hurt you but I have to inform that your husband is forced to resign.

  4. I’m sorry; if you want to know my feelings, it is I don’t love you.

  5. Mình xin lỗi khi phải thông báo với cậu một tin là anh ấy sẽ không đến dự tiệc tối nay đâu. Anh ấy đã đi công tác xa rồi.


Strategy 5: Offering/suggesting options

Since giving bad news is highly face-threatening, S can use this strategy as a way out. In this case, S does not infringe on H’s freedom by proposing an option which he thinks could be possible for H to take.



  1. Có lẽ hai ta có duyên mà không có phận. Anh hãy quên em đi nhé. (Thế giới Phụ nữ 32/ 2003)

  2. You wouldn’t worry so much about him. We have more important things to do.

  3. I would like to advise you that you could do well to pass the exam.


Strategy 6: Showing concern (to H)

By hedging, S wants to show that he notices or attend to H’s face. Meanwhile, what he wants to communicate is that his attitude towards H is sincere and that what he wishes is always beneficial to H.



  1. Nói thật là mẹ tao đã nhờ người chạy việc cho mày rồi mà không được.

  2. Nói đơn giản là anh nhà ta đã mắc phải một căn bệnh mà hiện nay y học vẫn chưa có thuốc chữa nhưng chịu khó chữa trị là kéo dài được sự sống đấy.

  3. To be honest, I don’t seem interested in him any more.

  4. Frankly, the more I hear about your husband, the less I like him.

  5. Mr. Cameron, my husband hasn’t been well well. It’s ….. honesty, it is not something I can explain over the phone.



Strategy 7: Mentioning/ Giving conditions

This strategy focuses on the conditions suggested by S, implying that there should be some benefits for H if he takes it seriously.



  1. Sir, if you think my paper is interesting; I will make you another copy.

  2. Nếu dì mà cứ ca cẩm thế này thì cháu sợ là vợ chưa cưới của thằng Lâm nó chết khiếp. (If you keep complaining like this, I am afraid Lam’s fiancé will be scared of you.)

  3. Cháu nói thật nhé, nếu chú mà cứ nói nhiều thế này, cô ấy sẽ lại đi du lịch cho mà xem. (Frankly speaking, if you talked too much like this, she would go away for her holiday).

  4. Em gái ơi, thua keo này ta bày keo khác. Năm nay em chưa đỗ đại học nhưng nếu cố gắng có thể năm sau em đỗ mấy trường chứ lị.


Strategy 8: Being vague

Using this strategy, S wants to show the vagueness of time, money, etc. By this, S also wishes to convey that those indexes may not be accurate, and thus avoiding to blame H for his violation.



  1. Em không biết tại sao hai đứa mình không nói chuyện với nhau nữa và xem nhau như người xa lạ.


Strategy 9: Passing the ball to the third party

Passing the ball to the third party means that S avoids giving his opinion directly, so he employs this strategy, by resorting to the third party. To do so, S usually quotes or cites other sources, or goes indirect by assuming that what H has is a consequence done by the third party.



  1. Anh ạ, em nghe cái Lan nói cô ấy cứ nhăng nhăng nhít nhít, cô ấy thích nhiều người lắm, có lẽ không hợp với anh đâu.

  2. Tôi thiết nghĩ sự việc đơn giản lắm nhưng sếp nói nó phức tạp hơn nhiều.


Strategy 10: Keeping silent

Keeping silent, as a paralinguistic factor in communication, could be seen as hedging strategy. This is because S is afraid that what is said can hurt the addressee. That is why he chooses not to do any FTAs, thus not inferring H’s territory.


However, Vietnamese hedges have their own distinct features. Interestingly, Vietnamese has a special kind of hedges called “từ láy” a phenomenon of word derivation, in which words are repeated to express different sense.

  1. Cái áo này trông nó xâu xấu thế nào ấy.

(Cf Nguyen Quang, Tạp chí Ngôn ngữ 11 (158) 2002: Chiến lược lịch sự dương tính trong giao tiếp)

  1. Không khéo mứt Tết từ trước tới giờ mốc xanh cả rồi cũng nên. Cơ mà mình có bóc ra đâu mà ngại. Với lại, làm quà nom sao có vẻ nhiều nhiều đèm đẹp là được. (Bùi Văn Trọng Cường – Văn Nghệ Quân Đội 7/ 1999)

  2. Chị đừng xồn xồn thế, chuyện vợ chồng cãi cọ nhau phải bình tĩnh mới giải quyết được.

  3. Thằng con bác trưởng thôn chạy xe lập cà lập cập nên gây tai nạn trên phố rồi.

  4. Ma tà quỷ quái gì? Chỉ giở người. Con bé đang ở cái tuổi hâm hâm nên thế. Một vài năm nữa nó khắc sẽ khôn ra. (Nguyễn Thị Việt Nga, Ám Ảnh: 69)

In daily conversation, “từ láy” are also considered an effective tool for hedging, particularly that is the repetition of “iếc”: ăn iếc, học hiếc, đi điếc …. (S does not highly appreciate what he is saying).



  1. Anh ta đi điếc thế nào mà đâm phải người đi bộ trên vỉa hè.

  2. Giờ học hiếc phải nghiêm túc vào con ạ, chứ cái Mơ nhà bác Hiền giỏi thế mà trượt đại học đấy.

The study of hedges/ hedging by many authors is already the mirror for the researcher to make a comparison and analyze contrastively the data collected from survey questionnaire.




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