Part 1: introduction rationale
CHAPTER 2: HEDGING BEFORE GIVING BAD NEWS
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- Điều hướng trang này:
- 2.2. From the point of view of semantics
- Hedging as an increase in fuzziness
- Hedging as a decrease in fuzziness
- 2.3. From the point of view of pragmatics
- 2.4. Hedging as both positive and negative politeness
- 2.4.1. Hedging as a negative politeness strategy
- Hedges addressed to Grice’s maxims _ Quality hedges
- English Vietnamese
- Relevance hedges (i) There are hedges English
- Manner hedges English
- 2.4.2. Hedging as a positive politeness strategy
CHAPTER 2: HEDGING BEFORE GIVING BAD NEWS 2.1. Hedging defined The word “hedge” or “hedging” can be broadly defined as referring to a barrier, limit, defense or the act or means of protection (see The Oxford English Dictionary vs. hedge and hedging). The designation “hedge/ hedging” itself was introduced first by G.Lakoff (1972) in his article: “Hedges: A study in meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts”. In his synchronic, non-contrastive study of the oral and written standard English, Lakoff defines hedges (from the point of view of language philosophy) as words whose function is to make meaning fuzzier (e.g. sort of) or less fuzzy. Lakoff argues that the logic of hedges requires serious semantic analysis for all predicates. Lakoff defines hedges as follows: “For me, some of the most interesting questions bare raised by the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness-words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as “hedges”’. However, with the fast development of linguistics, hedging phenomena, seen as a purely semantic phenomenon, have been attacked from the perspective of pragmatics, thus said to contribute to the interpersonal function of language, by which we are able to “recognize the speech function, the type of offer, command, statement, or question, the attitudes and judgments embodied in it, and the rhetorical features that constitute it as a symbolic act” (Halliday and Hassan 1989:45, cf. Vartalla 2001) Although the terms “hedge” and “hedging” have been part of linguistic vocabulary for some thirty years now, no unified description of the concepts is to be found in literature. As Hylland (1998) states “straightforward definitions of the notions are rather rare and the existing characterizations soon reveal that the terms are used in different ways by author”. Despite attempts to bring order into multitude of definition, it appears that researchers continue to approach the concepts of hedge and hedging in a variety of ways. Differences are also to be found in terminology relating to the area, terms other than hedge and hedging being employed to describe some of the linguistic phenomena elsewhere described as hedges. Notions like stance markers (Atkinson 1999), compromisers (James 1983), understatements (Hubler 1983), downtowners (Quirk et al 1985), downgraders (House and Kasper 1981), softeners (Crystal & Davy 1975), backgrounding terms (Low 1996), approximators and shields (Prince et al 1982) and pragmatic devices (Stubbe&Holmes 1995) appear in literature where the term hedge might be used by other scholars. Similarly, phenomena that certain studies call hedging have in other studies also been treated under headings such as: evidentiality (Chafe 1986), mitigation (Labov & Fanshel 1977), indirectness (Tannen 1982, Lakoff 1990, Hinkel 1997), tentativeness (Holmes 1983), and vagueness (Chanell 1994). Holmes (1975:73-5) asserts that devices which reduce the force of an utterance are generally labeled “hedges” and these hedging devices attenuate or reduce the strength of the utterance or soften/ weaken the effect of the utterance. They damp down its force or intensity or directness. By giving the notion of boosters seen as devices utilized to increase the illocutionary force of any utterance in which they are used, she deliberately inclines towards the idea that hedges are for positive politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987:145) define “hedge” as “ a particle, word or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or a noun phrase in a set, it says of that membership that it is partial or true only in certain respects or that it is more true and complete than perhaps might be expected”. This definition reveals a fact that hedges are “strengtheners” as well as “weakeners”. Hedges are sometimes extended to the area of gambits. They are conversational gambits which play an important part in conversations as the various social, psychological, and communicative signals. In Richards’s definition (50:118) “Gambits may be used to show whether the speaker’s contribution adds new in formation, develops something said by previous speaker, expresses an opinion, agreement, etc” Referring the so-called quán ngữ, a possible equivalent to gambit in his work “Từ và nhận diện từ trong tiếng Việt”, Nguyễn Thiện Giáp argues: “Gambits are repeatedly-used expression in discourses for coherence, cohesion, communication, emphasis on ideas” (English version by Ngo Huu Hoang, 2003:7) (Quán ngữ là những cụm từ cố định lặp đi lặp lại trong các văn bản để liên kết, đưa đẩy, rào đón hoặc nhấn mạnh nội dung cần diễn đạt nào đó) (1976:176) Most of the Vietnamese linguists agree that Vietnamese gambits belong to the “set expression” category in Vietnamese. In conclusion, hedging is considered to be a strategy used to hedge the propositional content (the propositional accuracy-Nguyen Quang 2003) and illocutionary force of the utterance. Along the line, the thesis author would add that (i) hedges are expressions which do not add any false or truth values to the content of an utterance, (ii) hedges are attitude markers that can be taken as an indication of speakers’ sensitivity towards the hearer. To have deeper insight into hedges, different linguistic theories should be studied in detail. 2.2. From the point of view of semantics In his article “Fuzzy Set-Theoretic Interpretation of Linguistic hedges”, Zadeh (1972) follows Lakoff in using the new destination hedge and analyzes English hedges (such as simple ones like: very, much, more or less, essentially or slightly and more complex ones like technically and practically) from the point of view of semantics and logic. It is assumed that: “Hedges are operators that act on the fuzzy set representing the meaning of their operands. Hedges vary in their dependency on context”. Lakoff’s semantic characterization of hedging portrays hedges as words that may be realized as two seemingly contradictory functions, namely those of making things fuzzier or less fuzzy. In fact, it appears that hedges have been considered by most scholars as devices with the primary function of making things semantically fuzzier. However, by approaching the status of hedges in how we conceptualize the universe, it is to illustrate that at the semantic level hedging may indeed be seen to have both of these dimensions that is to make things fuzzier and less fuzzy. Hedging as an increase in fuzziness Hedging is firstly often linked to purposive vagueness and tentativeness, which suggests that hedges are typically associated with an increase in linguistic fuzziness. This view can be traced back to Lakoff’s work which emphasizes that natural language sentences are not often entirely true, false nor nonsensical, but rather somewhat true and somewhat false. Brown and Levinson (1987: 145) explicate Lakoff’s work and say that hedges may be regarded as elements that can “modify the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set”. In this capacity, hedges can also be used to take place of the truth value of referential information somewhere on the continuum between absolute truth and falsehood. Hedging as a decrease in fuzziness However, many studies have disregarded Lakoff’s view of hedging as an increase in fuzziness. Hence, hedges may alternately be looked upon as devices that in fact decrease fuzziness. Hedges could indeed be interpreted to signal that the phenomenon under scrutiny does not conform to the limited conceptual categories of natural language, and by way of distancing the phenomenon from the core of a given conceptual category hedges actually render the relationship between the phenomenon of the universe and the relevant conceptual categories more accurate. The two semantic characterizations of hedging offered above both stems from the element of fuzziness inherent in hedging device, it probably often being impossible to distinguish between the interpretations in practice. Nevertheless, being aware of these possible interpretations is useful when we turn to the way in which hedging occurs in different communication situations. 2.3. From the point of view of pragmatics Hedging has more recently been approached as pragmatic rather than a purely semantic phenomenon. In much of the more recent work relating to hedging, it is the interpersonal aspect of the strategy that has been given emphasis, hedging has been analyzed with an eye on the communication situation, particularly the effect of the strategy on the relationship between sender and addressee in face-to-face communication. Generally speaking, the more pragmatics-oriented descriptions of hedging phenomena presented in literature are often rather circumspect notions for the purposes of a particular research project rather than thorough deliberations of the phenomenon. Addressing hedging, it can be defined plainly as “the process whereby the author reduces the strength of what he is writing”. Markkanen and Schroder (1985) define hedging as a strategy of “saying less than one means”, the function of strategy being to modify the writer’s responsibility for the truthfulness of an utterance, to modify the attitude of the author to the propositions and information put forth in a text or even to hide this attitude. Another author, in turn, see hedges as items that “signal features of hedging, avoidance of sender responsibility toward the referential information presented evidently being the primary motivation of hedging in these depictions”. 2.4. Hedging as both positive and negative politeness Much of previous work on hedging is based on Brown and Levinson’s treatment of hedges (1978/ 1987) where it is reasoned that hedges can be used to avoid “assuming or presuming that anything involved in the FTA is desired or delivered by H”. This is meant that hedging can be used to indicate that S does not want to impose upon H’s desires or beliefs. Brown and Levinson thus discuss hedges as a greater length as one of ten strategies linked to negative face protection. Hubler (1983: 156-159) picks up the idea of hedging phenomena as indications of negative politeness and contends that hedges are primarily used in negative face work, hedging devices being “detensifying” elements which sender can employ “to maximize the emotional acceptability of the propositional content presented to the H for ratification”. On the other hand, hedges can also be interpreted as simultaneously serving the sender’s negative face. 2.4.1. Hedging as a negative politeness strategy Hedges/ hedging in general belong to negative politeness. Brown and Levinson (1987: 105) appoint that: “In a literature, “hedge” is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set”
According to Brown/ Levinson (1987), conversational principles are the sources of strong background assumptions about cooperation, in formativeness, truthfulness, relevance, and clarity which on many occasions need to be softened for reasons of face. Here to, hedges are the most immediate tool for the job and the authors discuss such hedges on Grice’s Maxims. The four maxims of Grice recognized are quality, quantity, relation, and manner. - The quality states: +Make yourself as informative as required (for the current purpose of exchange) +Don’t make us contribution more informative than it is required -The quantity maxim says: +Don’t say what you believe to be false and +Don’t say that for which you lack adequate evidence -The relevance maxim says: +be relevant -Grice’s specific maxims of manner are: +Be perspicacious +Avoid obscurity of expression +Avoid ambiguity
*Hedges addressed to Grice’s maxims _ Quality hedges (i) Quality hedges may suggest that S does not taking full responsibility for the truth of his utterance
E.g. Don’t be so sad. I believe he is still alive. Em không ngờ anh hoàn toàn ngược lại so với suy nghĩ của em. Có thể em sai nhưng em muốn biết cuộc hôn nhân vội vàng của anh có hạnh phúc không? (Báo Thế giới Phụ nữ số 39/ 2002)
(iii) Or they may disclaim the assumption that the point of S’s assertion is to inform H.
E.g. “I am not sure and let me tell you why I am not sure. It seems to me ………I want to be as accurate as I can be. Seems to me the last time she was there to see Barry before Christmas we were joking (…..) and so I said would qualify or something like that. I don’t/ I don’t think we ever had more of a conversation than that about it”. (Bill Clinton – By Nguyen Hoa – An introduction to semantics, p.168) “Rồi như anh vẫn vừa nói đấy, bây giờ em đang băn khoăn ……. thì liệu rằng có quay lại với nhau đi chăng nữa, em có giữ gìn được tình yêu hay không? (An interview on VOV 12/ 2003)
E.g. He will probably coming He just may come
Anh cố gắng làm tốt đồ án và sống tốt ở Hà Nội nha anh. Rất có thể ngày anh bảo vệ đồ án tốt nghiệp em sẽ không ra cổ vũ anh được. Đừng giận em nha! (Báo Thế giới Phụ nữ số 27/ 2002) Em không thể nói, không thể diễn tả được mình đã đau đớn thế nào khi chúng mình chia tay nhau mặc dù chúng mình đã có nhiều kỷ niệm đẹp bên nhau.
E.g. The thief broke the lock, for sure I saw it I would say he won’t go out with Mary. _ Quantity hedges (i) Quantity hedges give notice that not as much or not as precise information as might be expected
(ii) We also get expression with clear politeness functions like “I just say” - I just say getting there is not easy as it looks. - A: Have you ever been there? B: Well somewhere in the Middle East
(ii) The use of “now” interacts with the use of tense deixis, now making a claim for relevance (because it is a proximal deictic marker) and past tense hedging a bit on the relevance Now I was wondering if ……………. (iii) Also under this rubric fall hedges on whether the point or the purpose of the speech act is in fact relevance. For examples: - For assertions: I don’t know whether you’re interested but………………… If you ask me, ………………………… …………….., in case you want to know - For reply to the questions: Yes, since you ask Yes, if you care to know Vâng nếu anh thực sự muốn thế Vì anh đã hỏi nên Anh có biết không Nếu anh muốn biết, ý kiến của tôi là - For questions: …………..., do you know? - For commissives: I’m sorry, if you want to know my feelings. I’m furious, if you care to inquire my feelings on the matter. - For declarative : If you allowed me, …………………….. If we all agree ………………………….
E.g. Do you have any flour to spare because I’ve just run out? _ Manner hedges
(ii) Not related are these expressions that query whether is following S’s discourse adequately
Such maxim hedges as those we have been discussing are used with great frequency in ordinary talk. According to Brown/ Levinson, they have in many cases straightforward politeness applications. Quality hedges that weaken S’s commitment may redress advice or criticisms: “I think perhaps you should”. Quantity hedges may be used to redress complaints or requests: “Could you make this copy more or less final?” Relevance hedges are useful ways of redressing offers or suggestions: “This may be misplaced but would you consider…?” And manner hedges can be used to redress all kinds of FTAs: “You are not exactly thrifty, if you see what you meant”. In addition to the hedges on the maxims with their FTA uses there are some which, while they may be derived from Maxim hedges, function directly as notices of violations of F wants. For example: “Frankly, to be honest, I hate to have to say this but ……, I don’t want to hurt you but (which preface criticisms and bad news)”. 2.4.2. Hedging as a positive politeness strategy In much of previous work, hedging has been viewed as a negative politeness strategy, but it may also at times be seen to have a positive politeness dimension. Brown and Levinson (1978/ 1987) are of the opinion that one way to express positive politeness toward one’s addressee; to communicate “that one’s own wants … are in some respects similar to the addressee’s wants” (1987: 101) is to avoid disagreement. One avoidance strategy is rending one’s opinion safely vague, seeking agreement with the addressee when the latter has not made his or her position clear. Sometimes, S may choose to be vague about his own opinions, so as not to get seen to disagree. For this reason, one characteristic device in positive politeness is to hedge these extremes in order to make one’s own opinion safely vague. Some hedges can have positive politeness functions as well, notably: sort of, kind of, like, in a way. E.g. I really sort of hope that your presentation will be good It is beautiful, in a way. True maybe. Каталог: jspui -> bitstream -> 123456789 -> 1841 123456789 -> Vò Quúnh Thu Cao häc K18 123456789 -> Khoa Báo chí Đhkhxh&NV 123456789 -> Acknowledgements 123456789 -> Danh mục chữ viết tắT 123456789 -> Chương TỔng quan vật liệu mao quản trung bình (mqtb) trật tự 1 Giới thiệu chung 123456789 -> Khoa hóa họC (141 142 báo cáo) tải về 446.91 Kb. Chia sẻ với bạn bè của bạn:
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